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ADR: ANOTHER ACRONYM, OR A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION
AND CROWDED COURT DOCKETS? THE DEBATE
COMMENCES*
RICHARD A. ENSLEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years a new direction in case management and accountability has emerged in many of our country's trial courts. Styled "Alternative Dispute Resolution" by its innovators, utilization of these new
techniques has been revealed in the literature only in the past three or
four years. Advocates of these new procedures seek alternatives to the
traditional litigation process which has witnessed escalating and more
complex civil case filings. They express growing concern with increased
delays and costs. Acknowledging the criticism voiced by the public that
our courts are swamped and unmanageable, they seek ways to terminate
disputes in a less costly and more timely fashion. Since the vast majority
of civil litigation is concluded by compromise, the proponents of alternatives argue that they are uncovering ways to expedite the settlement
process, while improving effective management of the judges' caseload
in the bargain.
In this same three or four year time frame, skeptics have begun to
publish concerns that alternative judicial methods may so undermine
traditional adjudicative responsibility as to seriously impair notions of
due process and judicial impartiality. The debate is, then, only in its
infancy. This Article joins the emerging controversy in the early stages
and analyzes its parameters. Commencing with the responsibility for case
management argument, it touches briefly on the possible causes for the
increase in civil litigation, before turning to a discussion of the new court
connected alternatives. This Article notes the processes available, the
early experiences of the judges who employ them, and then assesses their
efficacy and their future.
II. SHOULD JUDGES MANAGE THEIR CASELOADS?
To many, this question is no longer debatable. With the adoption of
*The substance of this article was drawn from a thesis submitted by Judge Enslen as part of his
Master of Laws requirement by the University of Virginia.
**Richard A. Enslen, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan. Prior to
his appointment by President Jimmy Carter to the bench in November 1979, Judge Enslen was in
private practice 1958-65; Peace Corps Director in Costa Rica 1965-67; Michigan District Judge
1968-70 and in private practice again in 1970-79. He received an LL.M. from the University of
Virginia and his LL.B. from Wayne State University in 1958. Judge Enslen is an Adjunct Professor
in the Political Science Department at Western Michigan University.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1930s, many state and federal
courts moved away from the central assignment system into a case management system requiring personal judicial responsibility.' The vast majority
of state and federal courts currently utilize the personal assignment basis
for case management. Prior to such adoption, however, most trial courts
had left scheduling largely to the lawyers. The court would not schedule
a civil case until the lawyers announced their readiness. In the past sixteen
years, federal trial courts have significantly changed their method of
operation to resolve problems of permitting lawyers to set trial dates often
caused by pre-trial discovery delays.' In 1969, most metropolitan federal
district courts transferred from a master calendar system to an individual
assignment system.3
Some courts, however, continue with a central assignment/master calendar system. Civil cases are not assigned to a judge for a trial until the
trial date itself. As the case progresses, different judges assume different
responsibilities, usually on a rotating basis. One judge may hear motions,
both dispositive and non-dispositive; another may conduct pre-trial conferences; and still another may hold settlement conferences. As a consequence, no single judge has any management responsibility, and the
case progresses (or does not) according to the pace of the lawyers. If a
lawyer desires a hearing, he or she simply requests the Clerk of the Court
to schedule the matter by issuing a praecipe.
Proponents of the central assignment/master calendar system argue that
the calendar moves promptly during "trial months." Judges are not predisposed to any consideration of the merits or the lawyers, and can take
a fresh judicial approach to the issues, parties, and lawyers at trial.
The individual assignment system, by contrast, places a civil case on
the calendar of a single judge who is responsible for it until its disposition.
This requires the judge to manage and monitor it through the various
stages leading to trial, and then, if it has not been settled or dismissed,
to try it.
Those who oppose personal management systems point out that the
judge who has been involved in various motions and, more importantly,
1.

Necessarily, pretrial procedure envisages the invocation of initiative on the part of
the judge. It transforms him from his traditional role of moderator passing on
questions presented by counsel, to that of an active director of litigation. [It makes
it] possible to dispose of the contest properly with the least possible waste of time
and expense. By exercising his authority to the fullest extent in this direction, the
pretrial judge not only advances the cause of the administration of justice, but also
enhances the respect for the courts on the part of the public.
Pretrial Procedure Abridged Report of the Comm. on Pretrial Procedure to the Judicial Conference
of the District of Columbia, 4 Fed. R. Serv. 1015 (1941).
2. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985).
3. Id. at 257.
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in settlement discussions or pre-trial conferences, may well form a bias
toward a recalcitrant party or lawyer, may tend to pre-judge issues and
people, and may ultimately believe the vast majority of cases ought to
be settled and not tried. 4 After all, opponents argue that a case disposed
of is a case disposed of. The judge who disposes of a case in a two or
three hour settlement conference receives the same "credit" as the judge
who conducts a sixteen week trial. Furthermore, the judge who settles
the case is "appeal-free" and will not be called upon to make various
evidentiary rulings, compose jury instructions, or perform other judicial
functions.
The central assignment proponents also argue that the executive and
legislative branches have already usurped much Article III initiative by
the creation of special courts, 5 and that "adjunct" courts, attached to
Article III courts themselves, may also have intervened on some Article
III powers. Of course, the latter reference is principally to the bankruptcy
court and to federal magistrates. It is contended that federal district judges
are very apt to adopt decisions from these tribunals without rehearing
testimony in order to "siphon off work." 6 A managing judge, they fear,
may further erode the adjudication process by assigning to others-neutrals--certain judicial "power" in an effort to settle cases. The litigating
public, it is urged, ought to be assured that those matters remaining within
the judicial branch of the government will have a free and uncompromised
right to litigate their disputes in a judicial forum free from arm twisting
judges who are motivated to look statistically superior by their disposition
of an increasing number of civil cases.
Professor Judith Resnik is, perhaps, the most outspoken critic of case
management. She charges that emphasis on judicial case supervision is
a departure from the traditional role of judges and appears to be inconsistent with our notions of due process and the adversarial system. 7
Professor Owen Fiss is also critical of personal management systems.
Fiss believes that adjudication, in the traditional sense, is far more likely
to do justice than case management or the utilization of alternative dispute
resolution techniques. He calls for a renewed appreciation of traditional
adjudication. 8
These academics, joined by some judges, have voiced valid concerns
which cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, individual case management, with
all of its potential evils, is a necessity in the latter stages of the Twentieth
Century.
4. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
5. Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 UNIV. CoLo. L. REV. 581 (1985).
6. Id. at 605-06.
7. Resnik, supra note 4.
8. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L. J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
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First of all, the judiciary needs to be held accountable. If judges are
merely called upon to try lawsuits or hear contested motions on weekdays,
they can work at their own pace, mindless of the mounting pressure of
the increasing number of unresolved civil cases. Judges can turn their
attention to more glorious ways of accountability-perhaps by penning
the erudite 75-page opinion which will be sure to be debated in the legal
journals following publication in Federal Supplement.
Federal judges often come to the trial bench following highly competitive careers. Many were active and often able trial lawyers. Others
pursued, full or part-time, political careers or were academics competing
with their collegial brethren. Still others were engaged in business enterprises. When judges reached the bench, their competitive instincts did
not simply dissipate. Instead, they revealed themselves in other fora.
Opinion writing, conducting the celebrated trial, writing law review articles, publishing books, addressing public audiences, and receiving awards
are some of the ways in which judges "compete" in an effort to still
demons who continue to demand proof of their worth.9
The monthly, semi-annual, and annual statistics forwarded to judges
by court administrative offices are instant and constant reminders of how
judges are ranked in relation to their colleagues with regard to disposing
of those cases assigned to them. They are assailed with data concerning
the length of time between filing and disposition; median times between
filing and trial; effective use of jurors; pending civil and criminal caseloads; and even their "standing" in the Circuit and the United States.'°
Judges are thus urged to be productive and are held "accountable" for
their management skills.
Those judges who came to the bench from the trial bar are well aware
that the busy trial lawyer, left to his own devices, rarely races to judgment.
As lawyers, judges most strongly disliked an order scheduling events
from filing to trial, and preferred, instead, uncertain trial dates (or if
certain, trial dates far in the future), an unspecified period of time in
which to complete discovery, and the leisurely filing of non-dispositive
and dispositive motions. Realizing that most settlements occur close to
the trial date, the case management oriented judge orders all events scheduled, which includes a chronological staging leading to a certain trial
date. "
A judge who is responsible for his own caseload and feels the responsibility of ultimately concluding marathon discovery, also brings to the
litigant, through the lawyer, some hope that their case will not be "lost"
9. From my own observations, conversations, and by examining my own soul.
10. See, e.g., Federal Court Management Statistics, 1985: Prepared by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts.
11. See my own "Order Scheduling Events," Appendix A to this Article.
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in the paper shuffle of the busy clerk's office. Knowing at the outset that
the litigation will terminate, and progress on a reasonable schedule, ensures
parties and the lawyers that some end is in sight.
Whether one likes it or not, personal case management appears to be
with us today and in the immediate future. Courts are assisted in this
new management by new hardware and software, by case managers, by
management oriented clerks, and by judges who feel the responsibility
of satisfying the statistical necessity of looking productive. While it is
certainly possible that the management oriented judge may become too
acquainted with the litigation, the parties, and their lawyers, this possibility, articulated by the academics, is but another challenge to be overcome by the fair-minded judge. Further, it cannot be said that the danger
of pre-disposition is unique to case management judges. An easily biased
judge, much like a juror, can be as swayed by an opening statement or
by the first few hours of trial.
"Impartiality is a capacity of mind-a learned ability to recognize and
compartmentalize the relevant from the irrelevant and to detach one's
emotional from one's rational faculties. '"2 Judge Peckham, Chief Judge
of the Northern District of California, argues that a judge must be able
to develop and possess these faculties in order to exercise the power
inherent in his Article III status. He indicates that a judge who presides
over a pre-trial suppression hearing where a defendant proclaims, under
oath, ownership of seized evidence to establish standing, is, nonetheless,
3
permitted to sit on the trial and issue further rulings.
In the pre-trial setting, a judge can assign a settlement conference to
a magistrate, or some other judge, and thus assist in reducing possibilities
for partiality. A responsible judge in any litigation is constantly assailed
with motions, pleadings, and conduct which assault the judge's notions
of impartiality. Regardless, vigilance and responsibility must go with the
robe.
Charges that judicial supervision weakens the adversarial system present a most serious issue. The adversarial system, however, in its current
form, is precisely the reason why civil litigation is so expensive and why
the courts are so cluttered. Professors Resnik and Fiss argue that the
responsibility for improving the system lies with the lawyers, whereas
Judge Peckham and this Article place the responsibility primarily with
the judge. 4 The responsibility on the part of the judge, however, does
not detract from the lawyers' function. Rather, it is intended only to assist
5
attorneys in planning the efficient progress of lawsuits.'
12.
13.
14.
15.

Peckham, supra note 2, at 262.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 265.
Id.
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Some of the dangers can be mitigated by the employment of some of
the alternative dispute resolution techniques discussed in this Article by
utilizing non-judges in non-binding fashion. The use of case managers
can also remove from the judge's view a myriad of lawyer requests,
particularly for continuances and for relief from administrative orders.
Indeed, such non-judicial managers are at the very essence of a wellmanaged trial court. 6
The dangers discussed in case management cannot and should not be
permitted to derail the judiciary from the responsibility of effectively
managing a civil caseload in the face of expanding litigation and the new
complexity in civil filings. Accountability, the use of management strategies involving others than the judge, and the improved use of alternative
dispute resolution techniques will, at the very minimum, reduce these
dangers.
III. A SOCIETY GONE LITIGIOUS: THE UBIQUITOUS CIVIL CASE
FILING INCREASE, THE "NEW COMPLEXITY," AND THE
COURT'S BURDEN
While not entirely free from contention, 7 most concede that the American public has become increasingly litigious in the past twenty-five years
or so." The reasons for this increased litigation are multiple, complex,
and not readily susceptible of simplistic reduction. Some of the causes
are obvious, others are somewhat more subtle. By way of the most
summary of treatments, they include:
A. The Congress
The legislative branch has contributed to increased civil litigation by
responding to the body politic in a variety of fashions. Civil rights legislation of the 1960s and 1970s has increased causes of action for civil
litigants. '" The Civil Rights Act of 196420 was, perhaps, a harbinger of
the years which followed. Statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment, in housing, in public accommodations, in the school setting, in
federal and state-financed construction and support, in licensing, in labor,
and even in the so-called private sector contributed greatly to increased
filings in the 1970s and 1980s.
16. D. SAARI, AMERICAN COURT MANAGEMENT-THEORIES AND PRACICES 61-114 (1982).
17. Daniels, We're Not a Litigious Society, 24 THE JUDGE'S JOURNAL (Judicial Administration
Division, ABA) 18 (1985).
18. J. LIEBERMAN, THE LmGioUs SOCIETY (1983).
19. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1983); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1983) (Equal Employment Opportunities); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §621 (1983); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601
(1983) (Fair Housing); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1983).
20. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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New legislation affecting our environment, our economy, our retirement
rights, our social security entitlements, state and local revenue sharing,
our obligations to serve the military or at least register for military service,
and our federal tax obligations are but examples of how increased leg2
islation has imposed upon the courts new and complex responsibilities.
Congress also increased civil litigation delays by enacting new criminal
legislation, including complex criminal syndicalism statues,' and by passing
the omnibus Crime Control Act of 1984.23
Through these enactments, Congress responded politically to public
pressure. As a result, the courts were left to deal with many new causes
of action, sometimes long after the political debate had subsided.
B. The Courts
The judicial branch is not without responsibility for increased civil
litigation, however. A host of newly created causes of action emanated
from the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, in the past twenty-five
or so years. Constitutional theories for new tort liability, Bivens causes
of action,24 increased court use of congressional post-Civil War statutes
on civil rights,2 state legislative 28reapportionment,26 expanded prisoner
"rights", 27 mental illness rights, abortion,29 and death penalty decisions," are but some examples of the courts' contributions to the litigation
explosion.
C. More Lawyers
While it may be a source of debate, the increased lawyer population
has probably also increased the filing of civil lawsuits. It is not seriously
doubted that any under-employed professional population will seek a
means to improve its employment prospects. Any judge in any federal
or state trial court will attest to the increase in filings in areas heretofore
largely unlitigated. School discipline cases are but one example of this
phenomena. In a single month in one court in Michigan, three students
filed federal lawsuits over disputes about their grades. One litigant sought
2 1. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1983); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1983).
22. See Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1983).
23. Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984).
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
25. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
26. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
28. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975).
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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relief from a school principal who had declined to "apologize" to his son
for giving the lad a verbal reprimand. The student had not been disciplined
in any other way, yet the parent sought "vindication" in the courts.
Terminations of employees often result in some kind of litigation. When
a plant ceases business in the locality, a variety of discrimination lawsuits
inevitably follow.3 Breached implied contracts of employment, age discrimination claims, and allegations of unions' failures to adequately represent their members represent additional evidence of increased use of
the courts by lawyers who formerly were engaged elsewhere.
It is also not unusual for a lawyer representing a client in a workers'
compensation claim to file a collateral suit for social security benefits.
While lawyers have been involved in workers' compensation litigation
for a long time, the increased social security disability filings demonstrate
the lawyers' "might as well touch every base" approach to the new
competition.
While lawyer over-population is probably not one of the major causes
of increased civil filings, it, nonetheless, is a factor.
D. The Contribution of Science
The natural sciences, too, have contributed to new and somewhat
complex litigation. In an effort to rule out the causes of cancer, toxicologists and epidemiologists have offered new evidence on the incidence
of cancer stemming from toxic substances discovered in our environment.
Suits against tobacco companies,32 and factories discharging wastes into
our rivers, streams, and air,33 are examples of this new wave of litigation.
The asbestos litigation by itself provides one of the best nationwide
examples of plaintiffs' use of new scientific information to litigate the
responsibility for cancer producing agents. In an effort to insure against
side effects of a massive government program to immunize the population
against swine flu, federal courts were met with a deluge of litigation.'
In addition, science has prolonged life, and new legal debates rage
over when life terminates and when life prolonging devices can be removed.
A physician's responsibilities to the patient, to the family, and to society
provide other examples of scientific knowledge causing the courts new
and complex problems. 35
31. See Massa v. Eaton Corp., (No. K85-15) (W.D. Mich.) (II plaintiffs alleged breach of implied
contract of employment and age discrimination due to corporate reduction in force).
32. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobaeco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. See, e.g., Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j) (1983); Unthank v. United States, 732 F2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984);
Daniels v. United States, 704 F.2d 587 (11th Cir. 1983); Petty v. United States, 679 F.2d 719 (8th
Cir. 1982).
35. See Note, Withholding Treatmentfrom Birth-Defective Newborns: The Searchfor an Elusive
Standard, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 187 (1984).
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E. The Role Played by an Increasingly CentralizedGovernment,
Business Environment, and Society
In a simple time, and in a more rural setting, people resolved many
of their disputes in the family, the neighborhood, the school, the church,
and business entities. As the government centralized, along with the
business community, and as families dispersed across the country, smaller
communities dissolved and became less capable of resolving disputes
among their members. The citizen, feeling frustrated by computerized
answers from his or her government or from the manufacturer of a product,
began to turn more and more to the courts for answers to unresolved
disputes and complaints.36 At the same time, the lack of trust in the
government and institutions, perhaps prompted in part by the Watergate
scandals, caused society to be less trusting of the ruling class. Hence,
lawsuits against schools, teachers, and Boards of Education involving
school discipline, against manufacturers for product implied warranties,
against doctors, lawyers, dentists, and other professionals for malpractice
highlighted this lack of confidence and further added to the caseloads of
our courts.
Whatever are the principal causes, it cannot be seriously doubted that
the courts are overloaded, and that the filings increase. In the federal
district courts alone, there was a sixty-three (63%) percent increase in
7
new case filings in six years-1980 through 1985." Possibly of even
greater consequence, however, was that the complexity of the cases increased
as well. Of the actions per judgeship filed in 1985, fully ninety-six (96%)
38
percent had some complexity above the average case. While this crush
of cases was being filed in one year alone, the federal district judges
increased their terminations by eleven (11%) percent in civil cases and
almost five (5%) percent in criminal cases. 39 "Federal judges are working
longer hours and more days than ever before but, like Alice in Wonderland, they cannot run fast enough even to stay in the same place."'
It should be obvious that the courts have more filings, dispose of more
matters, and address more new and complex problems than at any other
time in history. At the same time, the caseloads increased faster and the
backlog of cases awaiting decision grew during the statistical year ending
June 30, 1985."
36. M. HARRIS, AMERICA Now: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF A CHANGING CULTURE 41, 166-74 (198 1).
(The whole book is worth reading, however read the Introduction 7-16 if nothing else.)
37. Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 10, at 167. There was an increase from
188,487 cases filed in 1980 to299,164 in 1985. Id.
38. Id. "Weighted" filings figures for 1980 through 1985 were based on the weights developed
from the 1979 Time Study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center. A detailed discussion of the
1979 Time Study can be found in the 1979 Federal District Court Time Study, published by the
Federal Judicial Center in October, 1980. Id. 453 "weighted" cases out of a total of 475 were filed
per judge in 1985.
39. Id.
40. Chief Justice Burger, 1985 Year End Report of the Judiciary 3 (1986).
41. Id.
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What are possible solutions to this dilemma? Certainly not more adjudication as suggested by Professors Fiss and Resnik. Increasing the number of judges is a matter for Congress, but more judges seem to lead to
a self-fulfilling prophecy, such as an increase in case filings. Limitation
of jurisdiction is also a matter for Congress. This Article focuses upon
one suggestion-the use of court annexed alternatives, having as a partial
goal, the presentation of a more speedy and less costly system of justice.
IV. WHAT ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES ARE AVAILABLE TO THE
TRIAL JUDGE IN THE 1980s?
A fairly large number of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques have evolved in the past ten years in attempts to both assist in the
managing of caseloads and to bring disputes to a resolution without trial
in cases that might or might not have settled absent the ADR technique.
This section will deal with some of those methods which have enjoyed
the greatest publicity and sometimes have provoked the most debates.
A. The Mini-Trial
The Mini-Trial is not a trial at all, nor was it so termed by its innovative
fourpders. 42 It is a settlement device intended to assist in complex corporate
litigation.4 3 It is binding on no one (unless the parties and lawyers want
to be bound), has no sanctions, and is often employed without court
intervention or even suggestion.
It is usually employed after considerable discovery has taken place,
and is largely an attempt to persuade the decision makers, usually the
chief executive officer (CEO) of the corporations involved, that settlement
of the issue is the more attractive alternative to continued litigation. There
are no hard and fast rules for a Mini-Trial, although it is urged that it
ought to commence with a written agreement between the competing
parties as to the parameters of the Mini-Trial process." It is during this
negotiation that the lawyers consider the length, the depth, and the degree
of participation of the actors to be involved in the process. It can be tried
with or without a so-called neutral expert, tried to the opposing chief
executive officer, or in any variety of methodologies. 4"
Almost always, some kind of evidence is presented. Evidence can take
the form of expert opinions, monologues, or the more customary examination/cross-examination of an expert. It can include, or it can be limited
42. The Mini-Trial takes its name from a headline in a 1978 New York Times story describing the
original Mini-Trial.
43. E. FINE, MINi-TRIAL WORKBOOK i-DEFINmoN (1985).
44. Id.
45. E. GREEN, MINI-TRIAL HANDBOOK 21 (1982).
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to, deposition testimony, interrogatories, and other discovery devices.
The contract between the parties and the lawyers will usually provide the
structure in this otherwise unstructured approach to dispute resolution.'
From the literature, however, one can structure an approach to the
Mini-Trial setting utilizing an independent expert. The lawyers draft their
Mini-Trial agreement, and agree on an independent expert. They then
furnish to the expert the material they have amassed, together with briefs
of what they expect to present during the Mini-Trial. The expert acquaints
himself with the material prior to the hearing. On the first day of the
hearing, the plaintiff produces approximately four hours of "evidence"
in whatever form is agreed upon, and the defendant rebuts for two hours.
At the conclusion of that day, the lawyers and the CEOs discuss settlement. On the second day, the defense presents four hours of "evidence"
and the plaintiff rebuts. This day can be followed by a meeting of the
CEOs-without the lawyers.47
If settlement does not result, the independent expert contracted to render
an "opinion" can decide on the facts and the law. His "opinion" may
serve as the basis for further settlement negotiations. James Davis was
the "Neutral Advisor" in Telecredit, Inc. v. TRW Inc. He never wrote
his non-binding opinion because the case settled on the premises within
one-half hour of the conclusion of the process. The advisor facilitated
the discussion with questions. His comments often indicated where he
felt serious problems existed for each side, and he assisted the parties in
recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.4
Advocates of the Mini-Trial approach believe that the persons responsible for making the decisions within their respective corporations are
able, through the process, to understand the strengths and weaknesses of
both sides, enabling them to comprehend the cost-benefit realities of the
instant litigation. It is argued that those persons responsible for the ultimate decision are all too often sheltered by, consciously or unconsciously,
corporate counsel or even by trial counsel, from the "truth." The MiniTrial experience is intended to sharpen these realities, both in terms of
the probabilities of success and of the cost of continuing the litigation
through trial and appeal.
Variations on the Mini-Trial are unlimited. An independent expert need
not be appointed. Lawyers can try their cases directly to the CEOs. Live
46. Id.
47. This was the format employed in the first mini-trial, Telecredit Inc. v. TRW Inc., and reported
in various journals. See E. Green, supra note 45, at 22-26; Davis & Omlie, Mini-Trials: The
Courtroom in the Boardroom, Litigation (Fall 1982).
48. Davis & Omlie, supra note 47, at 24, and from comments made in a panel discussion at
Northwestern Law School in November 1982 by Davis, the two CEOs and the lawyers involved in
this first Mini-Trial.
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evidence can be presented, but need not be. The essential element is that
the lawyers and the parties have contracted for settlement discussions
without the intervention of a judge.49 No particular formula is superior
to another. While information is not completely available, it is believed
that most, and possibly all, Mini-Trials are followed by settlement.
The Mini-Trial was not intended for other than the complex corporate
litigation. At the date of this Article, it is widely acclaimed as an expensive
but largely successful method. It can be employed with or without court
rule, and with or without judicial order, but requires a maximum of
cooperation by the lawyers and parties. Cooperation is, in part, guaranteed
by the expense of the undertaking.
At least two lawyers have urged that a mini-hearing should be considered even in disputes between government and industry. Their experience
in a NASA case indicated that the Mini-Trial process could and did
terminate complex litigation in both a timely and satisfactory manner.
They urged corporate counsel, concerned about litigation management
and the control of litigation costs, to consider the process "with increasing
frequency. 5 o A Washington, D.C., law firm is so intrigued by the MiniTrial process that it conducted a one-day seminar for its law firm, inviting
"outsiders" to speak during the proceedings.'
While at least one federal district judge has become part of a minihearing process," the Mini-Trial is generally not attached to the court at
all. Thus, it falls outside the criticisms about a judge's neutrality, the
need to adjudicate most matters, and the judge's desire to improve his
caseload statistics. It was discussed in this section because those cases
which have had Mini-Trials were on the dockets and were being pre-tried
when the lawyers and the parties contracted for this extraordinary procedure. The remainder of this section will be devoted, instead, to courtconnected alternatives and will not consider "private court systems." 5 3
49. For the best discussion of the varieties which have been tested, see both the Handbook and
the Workbook published by the Center for Public Resources, and Matthew Bender & Company,
supra notes 43 and 45.
50. Parker and Radoff, The Mini-Hearing:An Alternative to ProtractedLitigation of Factually
Complex Disputes, 39 Bus. LAW. 35-44 (1981).
51. The firm also produced the most exhaustive single volume, apart from the Center for Public
Resources manual described in the footnotes, that has yet been attempted. Anyone seriously interested
in exploring the Mini-Trial process further ought to consult this exhaustive work, which incorporates
many articles, examples of many trials, and has proposed forms and agreements in the material.
Howrey & Simon, Mini-Trial Seminar Workbook (Sept. 20, 1984). See also Seminar on Business
Litigation, Dec. 6-7, 1985, prepared by Office of Continuing Legal Education, University of Kentucky College of Law and the Kentucky Bar Association.
52. Judge Robert E. Keeton of Boston employs a process he designates as a Conditional Summary
Trial. It is very much like a Mini-Trial, except that he sits with the competing CEOs as a sort of
"Neutral Expert." This process is annexed to the Court.
53. The California "Rent a Judge" program and the services offered by "Judicate," describing
itself as "The National Private Court System," are examples of the new "privatization" movement.
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B. The Summary Jury Trial
Conceived by Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio
in 1980, the Summary Jury Trial (SJT), like the Mini-Trial, is not a trial
54
at all. It is a settlement device, in many ways similar to the Mini-Trial.
Here, however, the nature of the dispute does not have to be corporate
litigation. Indeed, in its early stages, the SJT was employed for ordinary
tort and contract litigation.
Like the Mini-Trial, most or all of the discovery process is complete
when the SJT commences. Lawyers are briefed about the process in
advance of the SJT date. In the Western District of Michigan, for instance,
a pre-trial conference is held prior to the SJT so that the lawyers can
understand what is expected of them." Like the Mini-Trial, the parties
are required to be present.
The SJT takes place in the courtroom with a judge or a magistrate
presiding. In the simple two party setting, approximately ten jurors are
by the judge and each
summoned to court. Brief voir dire is conducted
56 The jury may, or may
challenges.
peremptory
party is entitled to two
not, be told at the outset that this is a non-binding "trial. " One school
of thought argues that SJTs are more effective when the jury does not
understand that its verdict is not binding because it will be more likely
to return a "true" verdict on the issues. Another school, however, advises
that juries will be just as responsible when advised, in advance,57of" the
disclosure.
nature of their mission, and that fairness dictates full
Each lawyer is given the same amount of time to make his presentation.
Usually, the lawyers are permitted an hour or two in total. Depending
upon the judge and the setting, lawyers can make opening statements,
presentations, and arguments, utilizing information gathered from discovery. There is no reason, however, why "live" witnesses may not testify
or be extended a brief opportunity to summarize their opinions. Evidence
54. Judge Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial, A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System (January 1984, revised October 1984).
55. The magistrate who has conducted the most Summary Jury Trials in the Western District of
Michigan always holds a Pre-Trial Conference. The judges in the district, however, do not necessarily
hold such conferences.
56. Like the Mini-Trial, "rules" for the conduct of a SIT are very flexible and are usually set by
the judge or magistrate with the input and advice of the lawyers. While the Western District of
Michigan has a local rule (Rule 44) permitting the parties to request the SIT, or the court to order
this process, there is no rule as to its conduct.
57. In the Western District of Michigan, the juries are not advised in advance of the SJT. They
are so advised, however, following the "verdict," and are invited to participate in the evaluation
process after the judge has left the bench. Not a single juror has ever refused to discuss the issues
with the lawyers and the parties, despite their being invited to depart should they choose. By contrast,
Judge Norma Shapiro from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania always advises jurors, in advance
of the process, that their verdict is not binding. A California professor, formerly of the Federal
Judicial Center, is currently undertaking an empirical study to determine which process is more
effective.
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cannot surpass, of course, matters known to both sides from discovery
or otherwise.
Following the lawyers' presentations, accompanied or unaccompanied
by live testimony, the jurors are charged by the judge or magistrate on
the law. They then deliberate exactly as a jury would deliberate, and
announce a verdict. After the verdict is given, jurors are invited to discuss
with the lawyers and the parties the jurors' observations of the strengths
and weaknesses of their cases and the presentations, and to announce the
reasons why the verdict was rendered."
When that process is concluded, a settlement conference is held by the
judge or magistrate with the parties and their lawyers. By this time, the
clients, their lawyers ahd the judge have a great deal of information about
the fact finders' observations of the case. There are no sanctions for failure
to accept the jury's verdict, a trial de novo can be scheduled, and, like
all settlement processes, the lawyers cannot use, at trial, matters which
occurred during this summary procedure.
Innovative variations on this process have included trying more than
one related case to more than one jury at the same time. In asbestos
litigation in the Northern District of Ohio, Judge Lambros has tried cases
to more than one jury for the purpose of establishing a "range" for the
benefit of the lawyers and their clients. This author is doing the same
thing with some toxic tort litigation involving poisoned wells, and for
the same reasons.
By way of an example, the plaintiff can select the "best" case in a
class-type setting. The defendant can do the same, and a "medium" case
can be presented as well. The purpose of "trying" all three to a summary
jury is to provide information to the lawyers and the litigants as to the
impartial fact finder's view of the litigation and "probable"jury verdicts.
The Federal Judicial Center has produced a video presentation of the
summary jury process as it is practiced in the Western District of Mich59
igan.
The SJT can be utilized by judges throughout the country with or
without court rule. The Western District of Michigan has a court rule
providing for SJTs at the request of the lawyers or by order of the court.'
58. See supra note 57. This is an important part of the whole process in Western Michigan, and
it evolved accidently. Lawyers always want to discuss a case with jurors after their verdict. One of
the judges in Michigan, after telling the jury about the nature of its advisory-only decision, invited
the jurors to remain in the courtroom and to frankly discuss the case with the lawyers and parties.
He then left the bench. A two-hour discussion ensued, and the Michigan court has been following
that practice ever since.
59. The video depicts parts of presentations in three potential cases (one plaintiff's and two
defendants' presentations). During the presentations, "side bar" comments were offered by the
presiding judge. A pre-trial and a settlement conference are depicted.
60. Rule 44(b) of Local Rules of Practice and Procedure of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan.
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There is no reason, however, why a judge could not order a SJT without
court rule since it is merely another settlement technique. Indeed, Chief
Justice Burger has recommended the SJT in his last two State of the
Judiciary messages. 6
Like the Mini-Trial, the clients in the SJT are one of the essential
ingredients in the process. Complaints about not being involved in the
settlement discussions should dissipate with the client's involvement in
both the Mini-Trial and the SJT process. Reassessment and vindication
are elements present in that process. Honest differences as to valuation
by competent lawyers and insurers are also addressed by the SJT.
C. Mediation
Mediation is most often thought of in the labor-management context
or in the divorce/custody situation. Usually, a single mediator in these
instances attempts to conciliate the differences between the parties. The
mediator's decision can either be binding or non-binding, depending upon
the situation or the law of the case. Sometimes the court is involved in
ordering mediation, and sometimes it is not. Both formal and informal
mediation occur on a daily basis throughout the country.
For several years, the state and federal courts in Michigan have employed
a new kind of mediation in which the "mediators" play only an indirect
role in the intervention between conflicting parties in an effort to promote
settlement. Because the role of the "Michigan Mediators" is different
from the more classical mediation, some prefer not to call it mediation
at all. However, the Michigan courts have described it as such in their
court rules.
In Michigan, the mediators are all lawyers and sit in panels of three.
Both the parties and the court have a role in selecting the mediators.
Discovery is occasionally complete at the mediation stage, but must at
least have commenced before the mediation hearing. There is a period
of approximately four months from the date mediation is assigned to the
date of a hearing. Discovery continues during this interval. This mediation
can be ordered by the court, or one or both parties can request it.
The lawyers prepare short written memoranda for the mediators in
advance of the hearing. At the hearing, each side is permitted thirty
minutes to present its case to the mediation panel. While the court rules
usually do not require the presence of the parties, more and more of the
judges in Michigan, at least, are requiring the parties to be personally
present during the mediation hearing. Although they are not obligated to
do so, the mediators often announce their decision immediately following
the hearing. The mediators are required, whether or not they announce
61. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 40, at 12-13.
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the mediation award verbally, to reduce their award to writing within ten
days of the hearing. Each party then has twenty days to accept or reject
the award. In the event that all parties agree on the mediation award, a
judgment is entered by the court.
If there is no agreement, the lawsuit continues and the mediation award
is not binding. However, and this is the most controversial provision of
the Michigan rules, sanctions apply in the event that the plaintiff does
not improve his or her position by ten percent at trial over the award.
Similar sanctions apply to defendants who do not make a ten percent
improvement on the downside of the award. Those sanctions apply only
if the mediation panel is unanimous, but it almost always is. The sanctions
include actual costs and attorneys fees from the time the mediation award
is rejected.
Although the rule has been in effect in federal and state courts in
Michigan for some years, the sanctions provision has never been tested
in an appellate court. Several cases have included such a sanction on
appeal, but they have all settled prior to the appeal. The argument against
the imposition of sanctions is that they might tend to dissuade a party
from exercising his Seventh Amendment right to a trial with a jury.
While the court rule does not mandate that the mediators affix a value
to every case which results in an award to the plaintiff, most mediators
in Michigan treat the rule in that fashion. Hence, they do function more
as mediators than outsiders might suspect. Lawyers in Michigan are
accustomed to mediation, and the program, except for the sanctions,
promotes little controversy. Lawyers who serve as mediators are reimbursed in a nominal amount paid by the parties, must have certain background requirements before they are permitted to serve, and seem to
enjoy their roles.
One of the advantages to the court of the "Michigan Mediation" is
that the court itself has little involvement or investment, aside from
helping select the mediators. The entire process is conducted outside of
the courtroom in a location that the mediators choose and the schedule
for the mediation hearing is, within limits set by the court, set by the
mediators themselves.
The mediation rule in the Western District of Michigan is attached to
this paper as Appendix B, and footnotes to this section have been omitted
because the entire Rule is provided.
D. Arbitration
Arbitration may be either binding or non-binding, like mediation,
depending on the circumstances. Much labor arbitration, for instance, is
binding. Labor arbitrators are generally professional, and often arbitration
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serves as their only vocation. The American Arbitration Association (AAA)
by
trains arbitrators, and arbitration has become a separate discipline
62
law.
by
virtue of its years of experience, by regulation, and
A new kind of arbitration has recently found its way into certain federal
courts as a pilot project. The arbitrators, like the mediators described in
the mediation section, are always lawyers, are selected by the court, and
are required to have trial experience in civil litigation. Like the mediators,
they are paid a nominal sum, but unlike most mediators, they are required
to "decide the case" as if they were the judge hearing the matter.
Most of the pilot districts assign all cases to arbitration with potential
damage awards below an established dollar ceiling as determined by court
rule. At the outset of the arbitration program, the amounts were relatively
low but they are now approaching more substantial figures. In the Northern District of California, for example, the figure is now $75,000, and
in the Western District of Michigan, that figure is $100,000.
In those districts that use arbitration, (if the clerk of the court determines
that the case in controversy will not exceed the court ordered figure), a
case is automatically assigned to arbitration as soon as the complaint and
answer are filed. A lawyer for either side may certify that the amount in
controversy exceeds the regulated amount, and if so, a judge or magistrate
decides whether the case should remain on the "arbitration track," or
whether it should be removed. If the case seeks only equitable relief, it
is not assigned to arbitration. If there are demands for equitable relief
along with a claim for money damages, a judge or magistrate decides
whether the case ought to be arbitrated or not. Whatever the amount in
controversy, the arbitrators are not bound by the court ordered maximum
limit, and can award any damages the arbitrators believe are fair and just.
Like mediation, the arbitrators are supplied, in advance of hearing,
with written pleadings from the parties, and the court rules usually stipulate the amount of discovery time permitted before arbitration. In the
Western District of Michigan, the period for discovery is four months,
but the time varies from district to district. It is usually, however, a
relatively short period of time.
Most districts hold the hearing in a courtroom type setting. The hearings
are scheduled to last for one day or less; live testimony is permitted;
exhibits are utilized; and the case proceeds along guidelines set by the
arbitrators in advance of the hearing. In addition, the parties are required
to be present. Most districts use three arbitrators, but one arbitrator is
the rule in the Western District of Michigan (even though that district
uses three mediators in the mediation situation.)
is the
62. See R. COULSON, PROFESSIONAL MEDIATION OF CIVIL DIsPuTES (1984). (Mr. Coulson
President of the AAA.)
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The most significant differences between mediation and arbitration are
that the arbitrators are required to render the verdict they believe to be
required by law. The arbitrators do not set "values," nor do they attempt
to mediate or conciliate. They can utilize their offices, after the fact, if
they desire, in a conciliatory or settlement mode.
Arbitration is also not binding, and a trial de novo follows where no
agreement is reached. There are minimal sanctions in arbitration, unlike
mediation. If one side rejects the award, however, and does not improve
that position at trial, sanctions can be employed by "taxing" the arbitrator's nominal fees. 63 Statistics from one of the districts (Eastern District
of Pennsylvania) reveal that arbitration is very successful in terms of
settlements reached before trial.'
E. The New Role for Court Appointed Experts, and the Special Master
for Settlement
Recently, some courts have begun to experiment with using yet another
"outsider" for settlement purposes. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Special Master is used only sparingly by appellate interpretation of Rule 53. In those circumstances, a Special Master usually
assists the court in "referring" discovery disputes, making reports and
recommendations to the trial judge, setting the scheduling conferences,
and in moving the case toward trial.
Several federal judges, however, have employed a settlement master
for the purposes of negotiating settlement. Judge Lambros has employed
settlement masters in the asbestos litigation in the Northern District of
Ohio; an Alabama court has appointed a settlement master in a massive
toxic tort case; and the author of this Article employed a Special Master,
for settlement purposes, in a complex and lengthy "Indian Fishing Rights
Case." In the latter instance, litigation that had lasted for fifteen years
appeared to be headed for another massive stage when the parties asked
the court to allocate the resource (fish) among the competing parties.
Earlier decisions of the court had given the Native Americans substantial
rights to fish the Great Lakes with no, or only minimal, regulation by
the State Department of Natural Resources.6 5 However, Native American
63. The Arbitration Rule for the Western District of Michigan is reproduced
in its entirety as
Appendix C to this Article. Footnotes have been omitted in the text since
they would only have
cited the same Rule.
64. For an eighty-five (85) month period (2/01/78 to 2/28/85), court statistics
reveal that out of
8,309 cases in arbitration in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, only 1.7
percent finally required
a trial de novo. See Statistical Summary presented at Federal Judicial Center
Seminar in San Antonio,
Texas, on March 15, 1985.
65. See United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979),
remanded, 623 F.2d
448 (6th Cir. 1980), on remand, 520 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Mich.), modified,
653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
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commercial fishermen, Native American sports fishermen, non-treaty
commercial fishermen, and non-treaty sports fishermen continued to war,
often openly, during the heart of the fishing season.
Moreover, and of greater consequence to the instant piecemeal litigation, was the fact that the resource was being "out-fished," and the
court was being required each summer to issue closure orders for certain
species in certain portions of the lakes. A trial date for this issue was set
by the court and a Special Master was appointed by an Order of Reference
which gave him both discovery authority and settlement authority.
The selection of the Special Master was unique inasmuch as the parties
in the lawsuit were given the opportunity to recommend people for the
position, and had veto rights over the judge's decision. Semi-parties,
called by the court "litigating amici," also had the right to nominate
persons for the Special Master position but had no veto power. The
"litigating amici" were in the case by their own petitions, and with the
court's indulgence, because they represented substantial fishing rights not
joined in the original litigation. They had not been permitted to intervene,
however, and hence enjoyed the unique status of "litigating amici."
After all of the parties and "litigating amici" had made their nominations, interviews were held over a two-day period with the lawyers and
the court. A portion of each interview was conducted outside the presence
of the trial judge. Agreement on two individuals was finally reached after
some negotiation, and the court appointed one of them.
The Special Master appointed set up a discovery schedule, worked
with the parties both jointly and ex parte, and finally conducted a threeday negotiation session in the backyard of the Native Americans, who
argued that their interests had not been properly represented in earlier
Treaties signed in Washington.' On the third day of the bargaining session, a written settlement was reached, which was later approved by the
Court.
The same court is now utilizing a court appointed expert in a massive
civil rights case filed by the United States against the State of Michigan
over prison conditions in three of Michigan's largest prisons. 67 Ironically,
both cases are styled United States v. Michigan.
66. Ironically, these very Treaties served as the basis for the earlier court order granting the Native
Americans substantial fishing rights in perpetuity. In any event, the setting for the negotiation was
Lake Superior College in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. There were over fifty representatives of the
parties and non-parties present with credentials as "negotiators." Such a large number of individuals
might have made the proceeding unwieldy. However, the Special Master divided those assembled
into different groups with varying responsibilities. When agreement had been reached, a large table
was assembled, and the principal negotiators signed the agreement, one by one, very much as in
the fashion of the Treaty of 1837.
67. See United States v. State of Michigan, No. 84-63, slip op. (W.D. Mich. October 2, 1985)
(opinion and order appointing expert).
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F. Community Alternatives
Some communities have established settlement centers without court
order in an effort to settle minor disputes. These centers are usually
established to assist parties in landlord/tenant disputes, neighborhood
disputes of all varieties, custody disputes between warring parents, and
even minor criminal and juvenile referrals.
The American Bar Association, through its Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, has assisted in establishing centers in Washington, D.C.,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Houston-, Texas. These centers, called "multi-door
resolution centers," permit parties to go directly to the center, or accept
referrals from courts, police departments, and other social agencies. The
relief-seeker goes through a "door" to find out what type of process and
what type of person will be able to attempt to adjust his dispute. Referral
is made within the center to a person who acts as a conciliator, mediator,
or settlor.
The resources of the community fund these agencies, but the courts
make considerable use of the agencies by referrals. Promoters of these
centers are of the belief that this alternative dispute process keeps many
cases from ever officially finding their way into the courts.
G. The Judge as a Settlor
More and more judges with individual case assignment responsibility
are, through the pre-trial process, acting in a settlement mode before trial.
These judges may employ some of the ADR techniques or they may
attempt to settle the case without an ADR referral. Some judges do both.
The question presented is whether the judge ought to assist in settlement,
or whether such assistance tampers with the judge's impartial trial mode
stance. Lawyers in several districts, however, appear to welcome the
judge's intervention in the settlement process."
The alternative dispute resolution techniques discussed in this section
are not, of course, exclusive. Neither are they incapable of modification
in each instance. A tactic that works well in one locale with one type of
judge, may not work as well somewhere else.
IV. WHAT HAVE THE "PIONEERS" LEARNED BY THEIR
EXPERIENCES WITH ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES?
The ADR "movement," if it can be called that, is relatively new in
the civil litigation process. While labor arbitration and some kinds of
mediation have long been in and around the courts, the techniques dis68. "85% of the 1,886 lawyers ... feel that involvement by federal judges in settlement discussions is likely to improve significantly the prospects for achieving settlement." Brazil, What
Lawyers Want From Judges in the Settlement Arena, 106 F.R.D. 85 (1985).
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cussed in this Article have no real substantial learning experience or
custom upon which to rely. Moreover, the judges who have employed
the techniques described here are few in number.
The Federal Judicial Center sponsored a very important meeting in
August 1985 in Kansas City where eighteen United States District Judges,
who had employed some or all of the ADR techniques, gathered for a
two-day symposium. A paper written by a Federal Judicial Center Fellow
served as a part of the basis for that meeting and the paper discussed the
varying methodologies employed and the reasons for employing them.'
There appears to be no dispute that the Mini-Trial should only be
employed in extensive and expensive commercial litigation, or in industrial-government controversies. At least one federal district judge, however, has utilized his own method of a Mini-Trial which he labels a
"conditional summary" trial. Like all other ADR processes, innovation
and utilization of the resources at hand seem to provide the best answers.
Those courts which have employed court annexed arbitration seem to
believe that the guidelines on the dollar amount and the non-equitable
relief supply the clearest answer on when to utilize this technique. The
debate, if any, in court annexed arbitration centers around the dollar limit
which will trigger the arbitration track, the number of arbitrators who
should be employed by the court, and whether equitable claims ought to
remove a case from arbitration.7
Early studies, conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, suggest that
cases referred to arbitration ought not be too factually or legally complex
for a truncated procedure; nor should they involve legal issues which are
so uncertain that resolution by a non-judge would be considered unpersuasive by most practitioners. This study points out that "straight-for7
ward" compensation cases are better suited to this process. ' The judges
in agreewere
at the Kansas City meeting, who were utilizing arbitration,
rules,
court
local
ment with the studies. All believed, however, that their
it to
returning
and
and the practice of "un-tracking" an arbitration case
suggested.
the trial calendar, achieved the result the study
The mediation process, described in this paper as "Michigan Mediation," does not have similar problems with regard to the number of
mediators or the equitable nature of relief sought. The Michigan rule, for
no apparent substantial reason, excludes constitutional issues. This omission may be an attempt to avoid appellate criticism and possible sanctions.
Most cases which are referred to "Michigan Mediation" are ordinary
69. M. Provine, Settlement Strategies for Federal District Judges (Aug. 2, 1985); submitted to
the Kansas City meeting as a draft, it was later published by the Federal Judicial Center in 1986
under the same title.
70. Id. at 52-59.
71. Id. at 58.
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compensation cases recommended by the Federal Judicial Center study
in the arbitration setting. Moreover, the Michigan Mediation panels attempt
to show the lawyers and the parties the probable value or lack thereof of
their cases. Submitting complex legal problems to such a panel would
be foolhardy, and it is perhaps another reason why constitutional issues
are excluded. Unlike arbitration, mediation cases are assigned by the
judge and there is no "automatic" track. Besides standard tort and contract
litigation, state and federal judges in Michigan are referring more and
more employment disputes to mediation in part because of the status of
Michigan law on implied employment contracts.
The use of SJT is more controversial. Some believe that it is most
amenable to ordinary tort litigation where the presentations are simple
and the issues well-defined for the jury.72 Others believe that lawsuits
which are unlikely to settle before trial provide the best setting for SJT.
The argument presented is that certain categories of cases, notably Section
1983 actions, suits claiming police brutality, suits involving prison conditions, and suits involving hotly disputed and public issues ought to be
considered for the SJT process.
An additional argument concentrating on time benefit considerations
is that neither a judge nor a magistrate ought to expend the time necessary
to conduct a SJT without considering the length of the scheduled trial."
This argument does not relate to whether a court should utilize ADR
techniques, but rather how to effectively utilize a judge's time in the
settlement process. The SJT, like most other of the ADR techniques, does
require the presence of a judge or a magistrate. The decision for the judge
is how best to commit scarce public resources in a resourceful and productive manner.
It is urged by Judge Keeton, a District Court Judge in Massachusetts,
that a judge who takes no action in this respect has made a decision to
commit judge time as opposed to what he labels "hands-off" techniques.
Keeton suggests a five sequence set of choices that should be considered
before deciding on the use of judicial time in a given settlement technique.
His paper includes an "Analytic Grid" for evaluating techniques of judicial involvement. Listing the techniques available, Keeton analyzes judgetime quotient for proceedings before trial; judge-time estimated for trial;
judge-time quotient for techniques of intervention; and total predicted
judge-time commitment. The grid considers the matter in hours and percentages of likelihood of trial.74
72. This was the initial view of Judge Lambros who instituted SJTs. See HANDBOOK AND RULES
(N.D. Ohio 1981).
73. R. Keeton, Make Wise Choices About Techniques of Judicial Involvement in Dispute Resolution, (paper delivered and discussed in Kansas City, Mo. 1985).
74. Id.
OF THE COURT FOR SUMMARY JURY TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Winter 19881

The judges in Kansas City were persuaded that careful planning, on
their part, was necessary before deciding to commit their resources to a
SJT, or to any other process involving the judge's time. One judge,
ignoring all but the time/benefit argument, employed a SJT in a very
complex anti-trust suit involving multiple parties and settled the case on
the eve of trial. That particular case had already been tried, had reached
the appellate level, and had been returned for re-trial. The lawyers anticipated a six month trial. Obviously, in that case, the judge became a
believer of the SJT process. 75 Another judge tried a very complicated rate
case, and while it did not settle, the ultimate verdict was so comparable
to the summary jury trial verdict that it apparently validated the process.
This author is of the belief that the SJT is most successful in two
instances. The first instance involves litigation in which highly competent
lawyers are unable to agree on the value of a given case. Frequently, the
disagreement occurs when liability is questionable, but damages are extensive. To illustrate this dilemma, anecdotal treatment need be rendered
inasmuch as empirical evidence is lacking on SMTs.
In one case, a small child was severely scalded by hot water in her
parents' home. Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of a thermostatic device in the water system. Counsel agreed that a damage award
would be enormous, but apparently disagreed on the liability issue.
Defendant believed there to be almost no chance of a plaintiff's verdict
while plaintiff believed the child had nearly a fifty percent chance of
recovery. A SJT resulted in a verdict for the defendant. However, in the
discussion between the jurors, counsel, and parties which followed the
SJT, the defendant became alarmed at the amount of sympathy the jury
felt for the child. Indeed, when the magistrate told the jury their award
was not binding, but was taken in an effort to assist the parties to settle,
several jurors remarked that they would have made a substantial award
in favor of the plaintiff had they known that fact. (This instance also
underscores the controversy about advising the jury in advance of the
SJT whether its verdict will be binding.) As a result of those discussions,
and no so much as a result of the verdict, the defendant put together a
very attractive structured settlement offer, which was accepted by the
plaintiff.
In another instance, a head-on collision had resulted in serious head
injuries to a deputy sheriff. The deputy had collected modest policy limits
from the errant driver and had collected his workers' compensation benefits. Notwithstanding these benefits, the sheriff's injury was so serious
75. Judge Lee West of Oklahoma, who was assisted in this SJT by Judge Lambros. West reported
at the conference that only one case failed to settle out of twenty-five (25) cases assigned to SJTs,
and the regular jury agreed with the Iummary jury in that case. This latter feat was reported by
Chief Justice Burger in his 1985 Year End Report, supra note 40.
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and his family so large and young, that he was virtually uncompensated
for his head injuries. His lawyer brought suit against the manufacturer
of a gun rack which had been located behind his head and, surviving
summary judgment, was prepared to go to trial on a product liability
theory. The lawyers, once again, realized that the damages were very
large, but differed on the potential for liability. The SJT verdict, again,
was for the defendant.
After the settlement discussions which followed the jury verdict, and
the discussion undertaken by the jurors, the parties, and the lawyers, the
court held its usual settlement conference. Defendant withdrew the nominal offer it had made prior to trial. Plaintiff's counsel named a settlement
amount, and an excess insurance carrier believed it to be so reasonable
that he threatened the insurance counsel for the principal defendant with
a "bad-faith" settlement rejection. Ultimately, the argument of the excess
carrier proved persuasive, and the case settled one week later for the
amount demanded by plaintiff. The settlement was not large, but it was
in excess of the original amount offered by the primary carrier.
A second situation in which a SJT has been helpful involves the case
where the lawyers could settle the case, but the clients, largely for emotional reasons, refused all compromise. No matter which way a SJT goes
in this instance, the "winning" party is very apt to feel vindicated, and
to feel that he has had his "day in court." The "loser" may feel a need
to reassess in view of the jury's verdict, and especially in view of the
comments made by jurors following the "verdict."
Again, and anecdotally, one such instance occurred when two corporate
executive officers were litigating a breach of contract claim over the failure
of the defendant to sell a corporate jet to the plaintiff. Defendant's CEO
announced, on the morning of the SJT, that he would never settle. Hours
later, however, when a jury returned an award in favor of his corporation,
he offered to settle the dispute on the spot. Plaintiff, by contrast, through
very able counsel, immediately reassessed its position given the fact that
the jurors were so persuasive in their post-trial discussion, and given the
further fact that several other people in the courtroom, including the judge,
had "voted" consistently with the jury's verdict.
Lacking empirical evidence, cases are likely to be ordered to SJT by
judges who have learned from their own experiences. Hardly any judges,
after some years of experience, would assign a simple two or three day
jury trial to summary jury disposition, particularly when other less costly
and time consuming ADR techniques are available. The experiences,
however, continue.
In the Western District of Michigan, for example, three lawyers have
requested the court to hold a SJT by utilizing three separate juries and
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three separate cases. Twenty-nine or thirty plaintiffs, not composing a
class, have all sued a manufacturer for permitting toxic substances to get
into their well water supply. The lawyers, realizing the possibility of
exposure, cannot agree on the values of the cases. None of the plaintiffs
have contracted cancer, but given the latency problem associated with
cancer, they have based a large part of their claim on the increased risk
and increased fear of developing cancer. The lawyers have agreed to
submit four cases to two juries sitting at the same time, but deliberating
separately. The four plaintiffs are members of the same family and represent both stronger and weaker cases (but thought to be representative
of all plaintiffs) for plaintiffs. The lawyers have advised the court that
this will establish a range of values sufficient for settlement to occur in
all of the cases.
In another court, in the Northern District of Ohio, a similar innovation
was attempted when ten separate asbestos cases were submitted to three
jury panels. These cases were selected from approximately two hundred
suits awaiting trial. Each of the three juries deliberated separately and
returned three separate verdicts. Two of the panels returned a verdict for
the defendants, and one for the plaintiffs. The two juries who had decided
in favor of the defendants were then instructed to go back and make an
award for the plaintiffs as if they had decided for the plaintiffs. After the
second procedure, the verdicts were so similar that it resulted in settlement
of all ten cases. In this latter regard, there is absolutely no reason why
an innovative judge, with the consent of the lawyers, could not return
any defendant's verdict to the jury for an assessment of damages.
The SJT is so new that it can be properly described as being in its
"experimental stages." Until there is empirical evidence to justify or not
justify the continuation of any particular method, lawyers and judges will
continue with the experimentation, no doubt resulting in additional variation on what has already been tried.
Judge Robert Peckham reported in Kansas City about a new program
being tried in the Northern District of California. It is labeled "Early
Neutral Evaluation." The judge appoints a lawyer with considerable experience in the field covered by the lawsuit, who is often uncompensated.
That lawyer works with the lawyers and their clients in an effort to evaluate
the probabilities of a verdict or settlement at a very early stage of the
litigation.
The classification process will continue by those judges employing
ADR techniques. Of the eighteen judges who gathered in Kansas City,
however, no one desired to disengage from his own use of ADR techniques. By contrast, several indicated a desire to try one of the techniques
described by the other judges, and by Ms. Provine's thorough paper.
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While the classification continues (which cases deserve what treatment,
when, and why), the discussion of the value of these processes emerges
and is the subject matter of the next section of this Article.
VI. DOES EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE EXIST TO PROVE THAT ADR
TECHNIQUES WORK? IF NOT, SHOULD WE CONTINUE?
The search for empirical answers joins the issue and enlarges the debate.
ADR, like other movements, was commenced by innovative pioneers
seeking new answers to the complex civil docket problems of recent
vintage. The new ADR movement only started in the mid-to-late 1970s
and gained momentum in the early 1980s. Now the empiricists are questioning whether there is any available evidence that these procedures will
assist the process of civil litigation. This, of course, demands an answer
to the questions: What are the proponents of ADR attempting to accomplish? Are they attempting to settle apparently unsettleable cases? Are
they attempting to cull out of the litigation process some kinds of disputes
which are better resolved outside of the courtroom? Are they interested
in responding to the "litigation explosion?" Is their goal the reduction
of costs and time for the litigating public? As this Article has emphasized,
these are all appropriate goals to one degree or another.
Whatever the goals, those concerned about the effectiveness of ADR
are raising hard questions about traditional adjudication, due process, the
disadvantages, and the judges' continued impartiality. These concerns are
real and deserve investigation and response. It is necessary, as a starting
point, to separate ADR techniques into two broad categories.
On the one hand, we have witnessed in the past ten or fifteen years a
new kind of privatization: the private litigation center. These non-court
annexed litigation centers are also divided between the costly organizations which provide a service to lawyers and litigants who wish to resolve
their dispute outside the courtroom and the cost-free minor dispute mediation centers, now numbering over one hundred fifty in forty states.76
The private profit organizations are almost entirely undebated. It is
presumed that lawyers and clients who place their money in the private
system rather than the court system have made a knowing and monetary
choice. These lawyers and litigants apparently seek a faster adjudication
than is available in our court system. The only criticism is that important
public issues cannot be resolved in this fashion. Only rarely, however,
are such issues brought to private adjudication centers.
Proponents of the minor dispute mediation centers (like the ABA multidoor centers in Houston, Washington, D.C., and Tulsa) seek a quick
76. Edelman, InstitutionalizingDispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JusT. Sys. J. 134 (1984).
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adjudicative device for minor disputes involving disputants with limited
resources. The objectors point out that courts will be limited in their
ability to address issues involving minority rights, civil rights, and civil
liberties if such disputes are resolved in a private setting.77 Judge Edwards,
who disapproves of minor dispute mediation centers, expresses alarm that
some proponents urge that community resolution of disputes should use
community values instead of the rule of law.78 This concern is highlighted
if private ADR is extended to constitutional or public law issues.79 Professor Fiss has also expressed the same concern.8" Acknowledging these
concerns as being serious and real, it is suggested that as long as the
outside decision makers apply clearly defined rules of law, and as long
as the articulation of public law remains in the courts, this kind of private
dispute resolution can relieve the stress on the courts and reduce the cost
to the litigants."
The remainder of this Article will be devoted to ADR annexed to the
courts for two reasons: first, because the courts have little influence on
"private" ADR and, second, because the debate is sharper in the courtannexed ADR process. It is certainly undisputed that one of the goals
proponents of court-annexed ADR seek is a less expensive way, both in
money and time, to seeing civil litigation to a conclusion. It appears to
be generally accepted that nearly ninety percent of all civil cases filed
are terminated without adjudication.82 Because that figure is fairly accurate, one question is what prevents these cases from settling earlier?
Part of the problem appears to focus on the lawyers and litigants.
Lawyers appear to be concerned about initiating settlement discussions
because it may be viewed by their opponents as a sign of weakness.
Lawyers also tend to become as convinced as their clients about the merits
of the case, resulting in the lawyer possessing "wholly unrealistic expec-_
tations" about its value.83 Moreover, the settlement process is not only
difficult to launch, but it also has pitfalls involving, among other things,
uncertain notions about how to negotiate.'
As a matter of fact, judges and lawyers often share this same deficiency
in not possessing settlement and negotiation expertise. While they are
trained in law schools in civil procedure, appellate procedure, and the
rules of evidence, there did not exist much in the law school curriculum
77. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668
(1986).
78. Id. at 675-76.
79. Id. at 676.
80. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
81. Edwards, supra note 77, at 680.
82. Id. at 670, n. 8.
83. Id. at 670.
84. Brazil, supra note 68.
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that assisted them in developing negotiation abilities. This is more remarkable because ninety percent of the litigations' cases settle. Lately, law
schools have begun to cure this deficiency by adding courses to bolster
these skills. Nonetheless, adversarial lawyers and adversarial clients, in
the main, do not seem to know how to go about negotiating a settlement.
Judges have no greater skills, and really do not know what to do in the
settlement conference except what they have heard from their colleagues,
or believe to have been successful in the past.
Finally, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the settlements
occur so late in the process as not to assist greatly in cost and time
reductions. In this respect, the court annexed arbitration programs in the
eleven pilot federal districts have the advantage of placing a settlement
mechanism before the lawyers and the parties early in the litigation process. Early scheduling of conferences mandated by Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the utilization by the judge of the early
settlement device as the Rule proposes, further expedite the settlement
process. The Northern District of California's early neutral evaluation
program also seeks to provide the basis for earlier settlements.
To specifically answer the questions raised in the first paragraph of this
section, it is essential, however, to further analyze whether court-annexed
ADR techniques are functioning properly. The goals generally can be
defined in this fashion: (1) to relieve court congestion as well as undue
cost and delays; (2) to enhance community involvement in the dispute
resolution process; (3) to facilitate access to justice; and (4) to provide
more effective dispute resolution.8 5 All four goals are sought in the SJT
process. Sections IV and V of this Article described that process and
anecdotically pointed out what could be considered "successes" insofar
as these goals are concerned.
Judge Richard Posner, in a most intriguing and thoughtful paper delivered at a seminar on this subject at the Yale Law School in October 1985,
has questioned the effectiveness of the SJT, and has called for an extensive
empirical study of its use.86 While expressing confidence that the SJT
will increase the likelihood of settlement, he lacks confidence that it will
have a "big effect." 87 He seeks verification and proposes, for empirical
purposes, selecting randomly 1,000 federal civil cases, dividing them
into groups of 500 cases each, using SJT in all cases in one group and
no cases in the other. He would then measure the settlement rates between
8
the two groups.
85.
86.
Some
87.
88.

P. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, AND F. SANDER, Dispute Resolution (1985).
R. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Ci. L. REV. 366 (1986).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 376.
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A 2,000-case test of SJTs is virtually impossible, however, given the
selectivity with which judges employ this device. This selectivity is appropriate, given Judge Posner's concerns about the cost of the procedure.
It is unclear how Judge Posner arrived at the number which appears to
be larger than necessary for an adequate test of the effectiveness of SJTS,
even under conservative statistical assumptions. Such a study would also
be impractical, at least for a single court to perform. A single judge or
magistrate would have to try a SJT every single day of the year for four
solid years in order to try 1,000 cases.
In his paper, Posner relies in part on data from the Northern District
of Ohio (Judge Lambros's district). Using the number of cases terminated
over time in that district, or even by a single judge, is a demonstrably
unreliable way to assess the efficacy of a procedure that effects no more
than a small percentage of total dispositions in a year.
Posner also expresses concern that lawyers may begin withholding
some of their best evidence or arguments in a SJT in an effort to surprise
the opponent at the real trial, a kind of new "strategizing." 89 This fear
is, at best, unrealistic. As Posner indicates, holding back one's best
arguments at SJT is not a rational strategy for a litigator, and in my
experience, has not occurred.
Other points which Judge Posner raises in his paper are, however, more
difficult to answer. He is concerned about judges using jurors for SJTs
without specific authorization and legislation. While there may be no
simple answer for this concern, it must be recalled that the SJT has been
endorsed at least twice by former Chief Justice Burger. In most jurisdictions employing it, summary jurors and regular petit jurors are kept in
separate panels and do not serve both functions. Moreover, exit questionnaires used in Western Michigan, for instance, reveal no juror dissatisfaction after serving as a summary juror. While this may reduce
Judge Posner's concern about specific authorization, such concern does
warrant congressional attention.
Judge Posner is also critical that misinforming summary jurors about
their true function may have a bad impact on jurors and the system. Of
course, there are indications that many summary jurors, after the experience, think they might have decided some types of cases differently had
they known their verdict was non-binding.9' Are we not asking the wrong
question, however? The crucial question is not how jurors perceive their
own decision process, but how counsel and clients evaluate a summary
jury verdict. Perhaps lawyers and their clients would regard a verdict
89. Id. at 374.
90. This conclusion is based upon exit questionnaires returned by summary jurors in the Western
District of Michigan.
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delivered after an appropriately severe (however accurate) judicial instruction as persuasive.
Judge Posner's principal concern about the SJT involves its effectiveness in reducing the cost of litigation. He includes here the cost to the
litigants and the cost to the government in providing court services. His
suspicion is that the SJT is effective, but not all that effective, in producing
settlements. The proposition that the increased number of settlements
from SJTs reduces the overall cost of litigation is, in Judge Posner's view,
even less likely. 9'
It cannot be determined if SJTs actually save litigants and the courts
money with the currently available data or data that is likely to be obtained
in the near future. Ever; to be able to speak definitively about the degree
to which SJTs actually eliminate cases from the trial calendar appears to
be beyond our capacity, given the number of cases that go through the
process in a single year.
However, Judge Posner is, of course, correct that we must attempt to
answer, empirically, if possible, these hard questions. Many experimental
cases will have to be tried before we can determine with confidence how
many cases are settled by the SJT. Answering his question of how much
money courts and litigants save by avoiding trials seems to pose additional
difficulties. Yet, this does not suggest that we should abandon the effort
to evaluate SJTs. Instead, we should ask questions about the procedure
that demand fewer experiments to answer (or be more patient in seeking
answers).
Two alternative approaches can be taken to analyze the effectiveness
of the SJT.92 One would be to perform a controlled experiment as suggested by Judge Posner; the other would be to survey those knowledgeable
about the process, including judges, litigators, and clients. The latter
approach is the one followed by the Federal Judicial Center's early study
of SJTs.93 This approach is not likely to satisfy a Posnerian. skeptic,
however. Such a skeptic will assume that the judges who conduct SJTs
and the litigants who participate are neither disinterested nor objective.
Can one design an experiment that will satisfy a skeptic that the SJT
is effective, but that at the same time, would not demand an impracticably
large number of cases? The answer may well be "yes." It might be wise
to abandon the demand questions posed by Judge Posner and admit that
we are not likely to discover the answer to questions about how many
trials are prevented by the SJT, and how much money it saves litigants
91. Posner, supra note 86, at 375.
92. Provine, supra note 69.
93. Jacovbovitch & Moore, Summary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio Federal Judicial
Center (1982).
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and courts. Instead, we could seek an answer to whether designation for
SJT enhances prospects for settlement or does not.
Such an experiment would commence with some kind of designation
by the assigning trial judge as to which cases are and are not good
candidates for summary jury disposition. These designated cases could
then be randomly assigned either to the control group or the treatment
group. At this point, the litigants whose cases went into the treatment
pile would be scheduled for SJT and those in the control group would
move toward trial in the usual manner. Cases in both groups would have
to be followed to termination. The purpose of such an approach would
be to allow one to assess the impact of assignment to SJT and whether
that assignment had a favorable impact on settlement, further allowing a
determination of whether cases which failed to settle after SJT take less
time to try. It would also measure the SJTs' ability to predict trial outcome.
Such an approach is dependent upon several variables: the degree of
certainty desired, the proportion of cases which would settle in any event
without SJT, and the degree of improvement necessary to pronounce the
SJT a success or failure."
Although not satisfying empirical requirements, some data is available
from the Northern District of Ohio and from other courts. Additional data
is available from the Western District of Michigan. In that District, from
January 2, 1982, through December 1985, forty-six SJTs were conducted.
Only three of those cases have ultimately gone to trial, but none has
resulted in a completed jury trial. (One was a directed verdict, and two
switched to bench trials. Six additional cases have neither settled, nor
gone to trial. The remaining thirty-seven have settled.)
While awaiting needed empirical data, what should happen to ongoing
ADR programs? They should, of course, continue and, in fact, are escalating. Judges and lawyers will learn from experience and from the vast
amount of literature just now appearing on this subject. In that latter
regard, a very recent issue of a Law Review devoted an entire publication
to the cost-reducing aspects of ADR in civil litigation.9" In it, the authors
carefully analyze the problem of reducing costs and the progress being
made by the use of ADR techniques. In one of the presentations, Professor
Levin and Ms. Colliers note that judicial response to the cost dilemma
includes the successful implementation of ADR techniques.' The court94. I am deeply indebted to Ms. Provine, who has returned to her academic duties at Syracuse
University, for her recommendations for empirical review which I have adopted here. Such a study
is about to commence in our District, thanks to her insight and concern. I am also in debt to United
States Magistrate Hugh W. Brenneman, Jr., who, with Ms. Provine and myself, has contributed to
lively correspondence debates on this subject.
95. Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985).
96. Levin & Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 240-51 (1985).
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annexed arbitration programs were thoroughly analyzed in three federal
district courts and adjudged successful in reducing both costs and delay
in those courts.97
The judges who practice these innovations are, of course, enthusiastic
about their contributions to the goals set forth earlier in this section. It
must be confessed, however, that judges really have more information
about the structure of particular settlement-oriented procedures than they
currently do about their impact on civil litigation in its totality. Judges
have responded because a response seemed indicated, and have introduced
new procedures without always establishing the controls necessary to
measure whether changes have occurred in the number and timing of
settlements. This means the judgements about effectiveness must be reached
informally (such as at the Federal Judicial Center's seminar in Kansas
City alluded to earlier). This process, of course, risks premature adoption
or rejection of any one innovation.
For judges who want to try the new procedures suggested in this Article,
we must again confess that we lack reliable information about the impact
of the procedures in the courts which tried them first, and that it is
uncertain how transferrable the ideas are. It will be difficult to gauge how
successful a procedural transplant will be for four reasons: (1) no innovation stands alone (other characteristics of a court will impact on innovative ideas); (2) details matter; (3) personalities count (personal styles
vary widely); and (4) expectations about the conduct of litigation vary
from district to district.98
As the reader of this Article has by now surmised, the ADR techniques
discussed herein are controversial. Many judges and academics remain
skeptical about them, questioning whether settlement should not be left
to the parties. Moreover, this disagreement is not apt to dissipate in the
near future, given the absence of unequivocal evidence that judicial settlement efforts have a dramatic effect on the rate at which cases go to
trial and how they settle.
However, efforts in the area of ADR will and should continue, since
they are part of a broader trend. This trend is evidenced by the 1983
revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; by proposals to increase
the scope and power of Rule 68; by the increasing concerns voiced by
corporations and insurance companies in attempts to reduce litigation
costs by the move "in-house" for legal services; by teaching ADR techniques and conciliation in law schools; and by developing alternative
dispute resolution sections in law firms.
97. Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts,
Federal Judicial Center (1983).
98. Provine, supra note 69, at 114-17.
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The debate will continue and so will ADR. The technology is addressing
the four goals its proponents set. While sometimes lacking hard evidence
in the accomplishment of those goals, clients have become more involved
in the settlement process; lawyers and judges have become more knowledgeable about what it takes to achieve settlement; some of the techniques
(more than others) are, in fact, reducing the delay factors; and others
(notably court-annexed arbitration) are reducing costs. The lay community
in the SJT process has enhanced its involvement in the dispute resolution
process as has the legal community in the arbitration and mediation
settings. Furthermore, apart from ADR and the revised Federal Rules,
no other proposed alternatives have emerged to address the "effective"
improvement of resolving disputes. Because court-annexed strategies preserve the right to trial and leave constitutional and public policy issues
to the judge, the danger of public law resolution in non-judicial fora is
largely circumvented, and the neutrals, working with the courts, simply
seek a better, less expensive, and quicker way to resolve disputes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR), polled a diverse
group of public servants, scholars, long-time mediators and arbitrators,
and dispute resolution activists seeking predictions of the future of dispute
resolution. 9 The responses were strikingly similar: Courts will continue
to experience difficulties in promptly resolving disputes. " Increased costs
and delays, accompanied by uncertain outcomes, will encourage litigants
to seek alternatives. "o As we increase our understanding of dispute resolution techniques, we will come to understand its universal application
and will apply them with increasing frequency."2 Prevention of disputes
may occur where, identifying the greater number of disputes, structural
3
and organizational means of prevention are developed and employed.
However, there will not be a massive shift from the courts. People will
continue to place their trust in the judiciary to resolve their disputes."
In these courts more and more judges will come to utilize alternative
settlement devices to assist in reducing costs, delays, and in an effort to
deal more effectively with escalating caseloads.
99. NIDR published portions of thirteen responses in its April 1985 issue of FORUM.
100. Robert Coulson, President of the American Arbitration Association in FORUM.
101. John T. Dunlop, Professor of Economics at Harvard and former U.S. Secretary of Labor in
FORUM.
102. Theodore W. Kheel, a New York City lawyer in FORUM.
103. Laura Nader, Professor of Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley in
FORUM.
104. Lawrence Susskind, Executive Director of Harvard Law School's Program on Negotiation
in FORUM.
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Lawyers, judges, and academics have introduced us to a new methodology which, carefully employed, can be of great assistance to -the
courts and the litigating public, without damaging the rule of law. One
must be cautious, however, in the use of any technique which impairs
access to the courts, which threatens judicial impartiality, or which removes
constitutional or public policy matters from the adjudicatory process.
Moreover, one must be mindful to effectively engage judicial resources,
litigants' needs, and lawyers' abilities with a watchful eye cast towards
practical efficacy and reality.
The "Litigious Society," as Jethro Lieberman would have it, will not
wither and pass from view because alternatives to the full litigation process
have become available. On the other hand, more effective procedures
can short cut discovery excesses, resulting delays, and costs. It can also,
perhaps, reduce the frustration levels of lawyer and litigant alike, who
cannot seem to bring their disputes to resolution.
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Plaintiff,
v

File No.

Defendant.

ORDER SCHEDULING EVENTS
To insure readiness of this case for Trial, to initiate disposition by settlement,
dismissal, or other means, and to facilitate the completion of discovery,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
A. Joinder and/or amendment will be completed by
B. The deadline for filing motions is

The filing of motions should not stop the discovery process.
C. Discovery* is to be completed by
1. DISCOVERY SHALL proceed regardless of the motions pending before
this Court.
2. COUNSEL SHALL FILE A DISCOVERY REPORT within ten (10)
days after the date given above for discovery completion. Said report is to be
submitted by each party, detailing, by date, the discovery undertaken. It shall
further contain dates for conference of counsel at which documentary and physical
exhibits are inspected, made available for copying, and marked as trial exhibits
and the names of trial witnesses and expert witnesses, if any, disclosed in
accordance with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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3. TIME EXTENSIONS FOR DISCOVERY, joinder or pleading deadlines will rarely be granted unless filed within 60 days of this Order. It is the
policy of this Court to deny extensions. Discovery extensions are granted only
for good cause shown and the failure to promptly file a discovery motion presumptively negates subsequent assertions of good cause because of delay. All
such requests for extension therefore must be made by written motion (See
Federal and Local Rules) and may be set for hearing by the Court. All counsel
and parties may be-required to be personally present at said hearing.
D. This case is set for final pretrial on
trial
E. Bench/Jury trial in this matter is set for the
term. A schedule of the week your case will be tried will be forwarded one
month prior to trial.
(ADR method).
F. Your case will be set for
GENERAL INFORMATION:
*DISCOVERY: Discovery dispute rulings by the Court may result in the
imposition of monetary or dismissal sanctions. The following procedure will be
observed in resolving discovery disputes:
I. Written motion and brief must be filed with the Court by the moving party. The
motion must contain the following:
a. specific information requested;
b. the date the parties met (by telephone or in person) to resolve the problem(s);
c. the result of the meeting;
d. short statement of the applicable law.
2. Without waiting for a responsive pleading, the Court will issue an Order for Oral
Hearing on the discovery dispute. The Court's Order will describe:
a. date and time of the hearing, and;
b. due process notice that sanctions may be imposed on the lawyers and/or parties
at the hearing.
3. At the hearing, the discovery issue will be resolved and sanctions may be awarded
the least culpable discovery disputant(s).

INTERROGATORIES: THIS COURT REQUIRES THAT WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES NOT EXCEED 30 QUESTIONS. Deviations from this
rule require the party proposing to ask in excess of 30 questions to seek leave
of the Court to do so by: filing a motion; an affidavit setting forth the reasons
why additional questions are required; and a complete list of all interrogatory
questions proposed.
BRIEF LENGTH: All motions require briefs. Briefs submitted on dispositive
motions may not exceed 20 pages (See Local Rule 30, as amended); briefs
submitted on non-dispositive motions may not exceed 10 pages (See Local Rule
30, as amended).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
RICHARD A. ENSLEN
District Judge
SENT TO:
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APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Local Court Rule 42
(Mediation)
Rule 42. Mediation
(a) Eligible Cases-The Court may submit to mediation any civil action, or
part thereof, not involving claims of constitutional rights.
(b) Manner of selection of cases-A case may be selected for mediation:
(1) By stipulation of the parties with the approval of the Court;
(2) On motion of a party with notice to opposing party; or
(3) On the Court's own motion without notice to any party.
(c) Objection to mediation order on Court's own motion
(1) Objections must be made by motion for reconsideration within ten
(10) days of the date of the Court's order.
(2) Copy of the motion for reconsideration is to be served on opposing
counsel and on the Court.
(3) Mediation procedures are stayed pending decision on motion for reconsideration unless otherwise ordered by Court.
(d) Mediation Panel
(1) Mediation shall be by a panel of three (3) lawyers who reside in the
Western District of Michigan and have at least five (5) years of practice.
(2) The Mediation Clerk shall maintain a list of mediators which shall
have a minimum of fifty (50) persons at all times and shall be updated from time
to time in order to maintain said number. The Mediation Clerk shall select the
attorneys to be included on the list of mediators in a manner directed by the
Judges of the Court. Copies of the list of mediators shall be retained by and
shall be available at the office of the Mediation Clerk.
(3) When a case has been submitted for mediation, the attorney for the
plaintiff and the attorney for the defendant may each select one mediator from
the list of mediators. The third mediator, who shall serve as chairman of the
panel, shall be chosen by agreement of the respective attorneys. If the attorneys
are not able to agree on the third mediator, said third mediator shall be selected
by the agreement of the first two mediators chosen; if they fail to agree on the
selection of the third mediator, the Mediation Clerk shall select the third mediator;
provided, however, that the judge assigned to the case may appoint the third
mediator, and such appointee need not be on the list of attorneys and may include
a Magistrate of this district.
(4) If a mediator chosen by either party is unable or unwilling to serve
on the particular case, then the attorney who selected him shall select another,
or as many as is necessary to provide a mediator for the panel. If the third
mediator chosen, either by agreement or by the Mediation Clerk, is unable or
unwilling to serve, then either the attorneys for the parties or the Mediation
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Clerk, respectively, shall select another name from the list until the third mediator
is selected.
(5) In cases involving multiple parties, if the attorneys for either plaintiffs
or defendants cannot agree among themselves on a particular mediator, then they
shall propose one name from the list of mediators, and the Mediation Clerk shall
select from those names provided.
(6) In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, the Court may
order an alternative method of selecting arbitrators.
(7) Selection or designation of all mediators for a given panel shall be
completed in accordance with the deadline as stated in the Mediation Order or
within thirty (30) days of the order or stipulation submitting the case to mediation.
If a party fails to notify the Mediation Clerk in writing of the selection of a
mediator by the stated deadline, the Mediation Clerk will designate that party's
mediator, and provide written notice to the parties. For good cause shown, a
party may seek relief from this provision.
(8) An award may be rendered by any two (2) of the three (3) mediators.
(9) The Mediation Clerk shall be appointed by the Judges of the district.
(e) Procedurefor Mediation
(1) Time and place for hearing-notice.After a case has been assigned
for mediation, the Mediation Clerk shall set the time and place for the hearing
and send notice to the mediators and opposing counsel at least thirty (30) days
before the date set.
(2) Submission of documents-At least ten (10) business days before the
hearing, all documents on questions of liability and damages shall be submitted
to each mediator and opposing counsel, with proof of service to the Mediation
Clerk. The documents shall include all medical reports, bills, records, photographs, and any other documents supporting the party's claim, including a summary or brief of factual and legal positions.
Failure to submit the documents or the proof of service within the
time designated shall result in costs of sixty ($60) dollars being assessed, payable
by separate checks in the amounts of twenty ($20) dollars to each of the attorneys
on the mediation panel and sent to the Mediation Clerk with the proof of service
of the mediation document. If a Judge or Magistrate is a panel member, the fee
remains the same; however, the checks shall be made payable in the amount of
thirty ($30) dollars to each of the other two mediators only. The panel shall
make no award until it has received this fee. If any mediator shall waive these
costs, they shall be paid into the court and treated as recovery of court costs.
(3) Presence ofparties, evidence-A party has the right, but is not required,
to attend or be present at a mediation hearing. When scars, disfigurement or
other unusual conditions exist, they may be demonstrated to the mediation panel
by a personal appearance; however, no testimony shall be taken or permitted of
any party.
(4) Decision-Withinten (10) days after the hearing, the mediation panel
shall notify in writing each counsel of its evaluation. The evaluation shall include
all fees, costs and interest.
(5) Action on mediationpanel's decision-Written acceptance or rejection
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on the mediation panel's evaluation shall be given to the Mediation Clerk within
twenty (20) days of the mailing of the evaluation. There shall be no disclosure
of a party's acceptance or rejection until expiration of the twenty (20) days or
until all parties have responded with an acceptance or rejection. Upon receipt
of responses from all parties, the Mediation Clerk shall send a notice indicating
each counsel's acceptance or rejection of the evaluation.
(6) Preparationof Judgment-If the mediation panel's award is accepted
by all parties, the plaintiff shall prepare a judgment, approved as to form by
opposing counsel, for entry by the Court.
(f) Fees
(1) Within ten (10) days after the mailing of the notice of the mediation
hearing, the plaintiff and the defendant shall each send to the Mediation Clerk
three (3) checks each in the amount of fifty ($50) dollars and each payable to a
separate attorney on the, mediation panel. If a Judge or Magistrate is a panel
member, the fee shall remain the same; however, only two (2) checks shall be
sent in by each party, each in the amount of seventy-five ($75) dollars and each
made payable to one of the other two mediators. The Mediation Clerk shall mail
or deliver the checks to the mediators on the day of the hearing.
(2) Derivative claims (husband/wife, parent/child) shall be treated as one
claim.
(3) In the case of multiple injuries to members of a single family, the
plaintiffs may elect to treat the case as involving one claim, with the payment
of one fee and the rendering of one lump sum award to be accepted or rejected.
If no such election is made, a separate fee must be paid for each plaintiff, and
the mediation panel will then make separate awards for each claim, which may
be individually accepted or rejected.
(4) In the case of multiple parties, except in a case of derivative claims,
each party shall pay the sum of one hundred fifty ($150) dollars for each award.
However, in those cases in which an attorney certifies at the time of paying the
mediation fee(s) that he/she represents multiple parties without conflict of interest
and that there presently exists a substantial unity of interest between said parties
on all issues, said parties may pay one fee. The mediation panel may make one
lump sum award or separate awards to these parties, or a combination thereof,
in its discretion, which shall be accepted or rejected in a lump sum or separately
in the same manner as awarded.
(5) For good cause shown, the Court may alter the amount which a party
is to pay to a mediator.
(6) Failure to pay the fees within the time designated shall result in
additional costs of sixty ($60) dollars being assessed, payable in the same manner
as provided for in Section (3)(2). However, these costs shall be considered
cumulative to any costs assessed pursuant to Section (e)(2). If any mediator shall
waive these costs they shall be paid into the court and treated as recovery of
court costs.
(g) Hearings
(1) Time Limits-Presentation to a mediation panel shall be limited to
thirty (30) minutes a side unless there are multiple parties or unusual circumstances warranting additional time.
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(2) Settlement negotiations and insurance-The mediators may request
information on the applicable insurance limits and the status of settlement negotiations.
(3) Subsequent proceedings--Statements by counsel and the brief or summary are not admissible in any court or evidentiary proceeding.
(h) Adjournment of Hearing
(I) Adjournments of mediation hearing may be had only for good cause
shown upon motion to the Court.
(2) When cases are settled or otherwise disposed of before the hearing
date, it is the duty of counsel to notify the Mediation Clerk of the disposition
of the case immediately.
(3) If notice of the disposition of a case is given to the Mediation Clerk
at least ten (10) days before the hearing date, the fees sent to the Mediation
Clerk, and payable to the mediators shall be returned. Otherwise, the Mediation
Clerk shall forward the checks to the mediators.
(i) Evidence-The rules of evidence do not apply before the mediation panel.
Factual information having a bearing on the question of damages must be supported by documentary evidence whenever possible.
(j) Effect of mediation
(1) If the mediation panel's evaluation is not rejected by any of the parties
within twenty (20) days, a judgment shall be entered by the Court in the amount
of the evaluation.
(2) If any party rejects the mediation panel's evaluation, the matter shall
proceed to trial as the Court may direct. If the evaluation of the mediation panel
is rejected, the Mediation Clerk shall place all mediation documents in a sealed
envelope before forwarding them to the Clerk of the Court for filing. The envelope
may not be opened in a nonjury case until the trial judge has rendered judgment.
The penalty provisions set forth in subdivisions j(3), (4) and (5) of this Rule
shall apply.
(3) If the mediation panel's evaluation is unanimous and the defendant
accepts the evaluation but the plaintiff rejects it and the matter proceeds to trial,
the plaintiff must obtain a verdict in an amount which, when interest on the
amount and the costs from the date of filing of the complaint to the date of the
evaluation are added, is more than ten (10%) percent greater than the evaluation
in order to avoid the payment of actual costs to the defendant.
(4) If the mediation panel's evaluation is unanimous and the plaintiff
accepts the evaluation but the defendant rejects it and the matter proceeds to
trial, the defendant must obtain a verdict in an amount which, when interest on
the amount and costs from the date of filing of the complaint to the date of the
evaluation are added, is more than ten (10%) percent less than the evaluation in
order to avoid payment of actual costs to the plaintiff.
(5) If the mediation panel's evaluation is unanimous and both parties
reject the evaluation and the amount of the verdict, when interest on the amount
and costs from the date of filing of the complaint to the date of the evaluation
are added, is not more than ten (10%) percent above or below the evaluation,
each party is responsible for its own costs from the mediation date. If the verdict
is in an amount which, when interest on the amount and costs from the date of
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filing of the complaint to the date of the evaluation are added, is more than ten
(10%) percent above the evaluation, the defendant shall be taxed actual costs.
If the verdict is in an amount which, when interest on the amount and costs
from the date of filing of the complaint to the date of the evaluation are added,
is more than ten (10%) percent below the evaluation, the plaintiff shall be taxed
actual costs.
(6) For good cause shown, the Court may order relief from payment or
any or all costs as set out in subsections 0)(3) through (j)(5), above.
(k) Actual Costs-Actual costs include those costs and fees taxable in any
civil action and attorneys' fees for each day of trial as may be determined by
the Court.
(1) Construction-The term "Court" as used in this Rule means the Judge to
whom the case has been assigned unless the context indicates otherwise. No
provision in this Rule shall be construed to confer any right to mediation upon
any litigant or to preclude the Court from altering any procedure when appropriate.
(m) Northern Division-There shall be no list of mediators maintained for,
-or Mediation Clerk assigned to, the Northern Division at Marquette. All eligible
cases may, however, be selected for mediation pursuant to subdivision (b) of
this rule. When a case is so selected, the Court may make orders which it deems
necessary concerning, but not limited to, the selection of mediators and the
designation of a Mediation Clerk.
(n) Effect on trial docket-Selection of a case for mediation has no effect on
the normal progress of the case toward trial.
APPENDIX C
CIVIL RULE 43.

MANDATORY ARBITRATION

(a) Scope and Purpose-This Rule governs the mandatory referral of certain
actions to arbitration.
It is the purpose of the Court, through the adoption and implementation of
this Rule, to provide an alternative mechanism for the resolution of civil disputes
leading to an early disposition of many civil cases with the resultant savings in
time and costs to the litigants and to the Court, but without sacrificing the quality
of justice to be rendered or the right of the litigants to a full trial de novo on
demand.
(b) Table of ContentsSubsections:
(c) Actions subject to this Rule
(d) Determination of Monetary Claim
(e) Referral to Arbitration
(f) Selection and Compensation of Arbitrators
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(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(1)

Discovery
Hearings
Award and Judgment
Trial De Novo
Pending Cases
Effective Date

(m) Relationship to Mediation

(c) Actions Subject to this Rule-All civil actions (excluding social security
actions and pro se civil rights actions) wherein money damages only are being
sought in an amount not in excess of $100,000, exclusive of punitive damages,
interest, costs, and attorney fees, shall be subject to this Rule.
(1) Non-Monetary Relief Claim-Actions which are subject to this Rule
except that they include a claim for non-monetary relief shall be referred to the
assigned Judge or Magistrate immediately after the filing of a responsive pleading
for determination whether for purposes of this Rule that claim is insubstantial.
That determination may be made, in the Court's discretion, ex parte or following
consultation with the parties.
(2) The parties may consent to arbitration as provided in this Rule with
respect to any action not otherwise within its provisions.
(3) The parties may stipulate in writing prior to the hearing that the award
of the arbitrator shall be deemed a final determination on the merits and that
judgment shall be entered thereon by the Court.
(d) Determination of Monetary Claim(1) For the purpose of making a determination concerning the dollar
amount of unstated or unliquidated claims incident to the application of subsection
(c) of this Rule, claims for damages shall be presumed in all cases to be less
than $100,000 exclusive of punitive damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees,
unless counsel asserting the claim certifies in writing under oath, consistent with
Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before the case is referred by
the Clerk for arbitration, the damages recoverable exceed $100,000 exclusive
of punitive damages, costs and attorney fees. Such certification shall include
itemization and specification of the components of damage claimed.
(2) Notwithstanding the amount alleged or stated in a party's pleadings
relating to liquidated claims, and despite a party's certification concerning the
amount recoverable with regard to unliquidated claims, a District Judge or Magistrate may in any appropriate case at any time disregard such allegation or such
certificate and require arbitration if satisfied that recoverable damages do not in
fact exceed $100,000 exclusive of punitive damages, interest, costs and attorney
fees.
(e) Referral to Arbitration(1) Time for Referral-Every action subject to this Rule shall be referred
to arbitration by the Clerk in accordance with the procedures under this Rule
twenty (20) days after the filing of the last responsive pleading, except as otherwise provided. If any party notices a motion to dismiss under the provisions of
Rule 12(a) and/or (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the expiration of the twenty-day period, the motion shall be heard by the assigned Judge
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or Magistrate and further proceedings under this Rule will be deferred pending
decision on the motion. If the action is not dismissed or otherwise terminated
as the result of the decision on the motion, it shall be referred to arbitration
twenty (20) days after the filing of the decision.
No Rule 56 motion will be noticed or heard prior to completion of the
arbitration process.
(2) Authority of Assigned Judge-Notwithstanding any provision of this
Rule, every action subject to this Rule shall be assigned to a Judge upon filing
in the normal course in accordance with the Court's assignment plan, and the
assigned Judge and in his absence, a Magistrate, shall have authority, in his
discretion, to conduct status and settlement conferences and in all other respects
supervise the action in accordance with these Rules notwithstanding its referral
to arbitration.
(3) Relieffrom Referral-At any time prior to the expiration of the twentyday period following the filing of the last responsive pleading, any party may
notice a motion for relief from the operation of this Rule. Such motion shall
conform to the requirements of Local Rule 27 and shall be supported by a
memorandum and, if appropriate, declarations showing good cause. The assigned
Judge, or Magistrate, may, in his discretion, exempt an action from application
of this Rule where a party has demonstrated the existence of significant and
complex questions of law or fact or other grounds for finding good cause.
Furthermore, any civil action subject to arbitration pursuant to this Rule
may be exempt or withdrawn from arbitration by the presiding Judge or Magistrate at any time on his own motion, before or after reference, upon a determination for any reason that the case is not suitable for arbitration.
(f) Selection and Compensation of Arbitrators(1) Certification of Arbitrators(i) The Chief Judge shall certify as many arbitrators as determined to
be necessary under this Rule, after consultation with the Judges of the
Court and the Court's Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Rule
41).
(ii) An individual may be certified to serve as an arbitrator if he or
she
(1) has been for at least five years a member of the bar of the
State of Michigan; and
(2) is admitted to practice before the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Michigan;
(3) is determined by the Judges to be qualified and competent to
perform the duties of an arbitrator.
(iii) Each individual certified as an arbitrator shall take the oath of
affirmation prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 453 before serving as an arbitrator.
(iv) Lists of all persons certified as arbitrators shall be maintained in
the office of the Clerk at Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo and Marquette.
(2) Compensation and Expenses ofArbitrators-Arbitratorsshall be paid
a fee of $250 and shall be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred. At the
time when the arbitrator files his or her decision, he or she should submit a
voucher on the form prescribed by the Clerk for payment by the Administrative
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Office of the United States Courts of compensation and reasonable expenses
necessarily incurred in the performance of the duties under this Rule. No reimbursement will be made for the cost of office or other space for the hearing. In
determining whether actual expenses incurred are reasonable, the arbitrator shall
be guided by the prevailing limitations placed upon travel and subsistence expenses
of federal judiciary employees in accordance with existing travel regulations. In
cases settling within a period of two (2) days prior to a scheduled arbitration
hearing, an arbitrator may apply for compensation in the amount of $50,00 plus
expenses reasonably incurred, upon representation that prior to the settlement
he or she had been actively studying the documents submitted by the parties.
(3) Selection of Arbitratorin Case to be Heard(i) Action by the Clerk-Whenever an action is referred to Arbitration
pursuant to this Rule, the Clerk shall forthwith furnish to each party a list
of three arbitrators whose names shall have been drawn at random from
the roster of arbitrators maintained in the Clerk's Office.
Provided, however, that the Clerk shall remove from consideration
and selection the name of any arbitrator then having five pending cases
for arbitration.
In the event that there is more than one party plaintiff and/or defendant,
the Clerk shall then submit a number of names or arbitrators equal to the
number of parties, plus one.
(ii) Action by Party or Counsel(1) One plaintiff and one defendant-Each side shall be entitled
to strike one name from the three names produced by the Clerk. In
the event more than one name remains, viz. If both parties strike the
same name(s), the Clerk shall select the arbitrator at random from the
names remaining.
(2) More than one party plaintiff and/or party defendant-The
Clerk shall have furnished the names of arbitrators equal to the number
of parties plus one and each party may strike one name.
In the event more than one name remains, the Clerk shall reduce
the number of arbitrators to one as provided for in (ii) (1).
(iii) Failureto Strike-In the event that any party or his (her) counsel
fails to comply with the provisions of subsection (f) (3) (ii) (1) or (2), the
Clerk shall strike a name of an arbitrator for the party failing to do so
through the random system.
(iv) Notification by the Clerk-The Clerk shall promptly notify the
person whose name appears as the choice of the parties of their selection,
or, if no choices have been made, the person he has selected. If any person
so selected is unable or unwilling to serve, the Clerk shall notify the parties
and the process will be followed again as in subsection (f) (3) (i) (ii) (iii)
with a new panel.
(v) Disqualification(1) No person shall serve as an arbitrator in an action in which
any of the circumstances specified in 28 U.S.C. §455 exist or may
in good faith be believed to exist.
(2) Withdrawal by Arbitrator-Any person whose name appears
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on the roster maintained in the Clerk's office may ask at any time to
have his name removed or, if selected to serve, decline to serve, but
remain on the roster.
(g) Discovery-Discovery shall be limited to 120 days from and after the last
responsive pleading.
Provided, however, that in computation of time for discovery, such time as
taken to dispose of motions as set forth in subsection (e) shall not be charged
against the 120 days allowable for discovery.
(h) Hearings(1) Hearing date-The Clerk shall set a date for hearing not less than 20
nor more than 45 days after the time allotted for discovery [subsection (g)] and
after the arbitrator has been selected under the provisions of subsection (f) (3).
(2) Continuances-The date for hearing shall not be continued except for
extreme and unanticipated emergencies as established in writing and approved
by the Judge (or in the event of his unavailability, by a Magistrate) assigned to
the case. Discovery shall have terminated twenty (20) days prior to the hearing.
(3) Submission of Documents-At least ten (10) business days prior to
the hearing, a summary or brief of factual and legal positions together with
copies or photographs of all documents on questions of liability and damages
shall be marked for identification and submitted to the arbitrator and opposing
counsel, with proof of service to the Clerk of the Court. The documents shall
include all medical reports, bills, records, photographs, and any other documents
supporting the party's claim. The arbitrator may refuse to receive into evidence
any exhibit, a copy or photograph of which has not been delivered to the adverse
party, as provided herein. Failure to submit the documents or proof of service
within the time designated shall result in costs of sixty dollars ($60.00) being
assessed, payable to the arbitrator and sent to the arbitration clerk with the proof
of service of the arbitration documents. If the arbitrator shall waive these costs,
they shall be paid into the court and treated as recovery of court costs.
(4) Presence of Parties-Eachindividual who is a party shall attend the
hearing in person. Each party which is a corporation, governmental body, or
other entity, including an unnamed party, shall be represented at the hearing by
an officer or other person with complete settlement authority.
(5) Conduct of Hearing-Each party shall be allowed a maximum of
2'/2 hours for the presentation of its case. The conduct of the hearing and the
admission of evidence shall be within the discretion of the arbitrator. It is contemplated that presentations will be made in summary fashion; however, witnesses may testify in person, but the scope of direct and cross-examination shall
be within the discretion of the arbitrator. The arbitrator is authorized to administer
oaths and affirmations and all testimony shall be given under oath or affirmation.
(6) Transcriptof Recording-A party may cause a transcript or recording
to be made of the proceedings at its expense, but shall, at the request of the
opposing party, make a copy available to the party at no charge, unless the parties
have otherwise agreed. In the absence of agreement of the parties and except as
provided in subsection (j) (2) relating to impeachment, no transcript of the
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proceedings shall be admissible in evidence at any subsequent de novo trial of
the action.
(7) Time of Hearing-Unlessthe parties agree otherwise, hearings shall
be held during normal business hours.
(8) Place of Hearing-Hearingsshall be held at any location within the
Western District of Michigan designated by the arbitrator. Hearings may be held
in any courtroom or other room in any federal, state, or county courthouse or
office building made available to the arbitrator by the Clerk's Office. When no
such room is available, the hearing shall be held at any other suitable location
selected by the arbitrator. In making the selection, the arbitrator shall consider
the convenience of the parties and the witnesses.
(9) Authority of Arbitrator-The arbitrator shall be authorized to make
reasonable rules and issue orders necessary for the fair and efficient conduct of
the hearing before him.
(10) Ex ParteCommunication-Thereshall be no ex parte communication
between an arbitrator and any counsel or party on any matter touching the action
except for purposes of scheduling or continuing the hearing.
(i) Award and Judgment(1) Announcement and Filing of Award-The arbitrator shall endeavor to
announce the award to the parties immediately upon conclusion of the hearing;
but in any event shall file the award with the Clerk's office not more than ten
days following the close of the hearing. The Clerk shall serve copies on the
parties.
(2) Form of Award-The award shall state clearly and concisely the name
or names of the prevailing party or parties and the party or parties against which
it is rendered, and the precise amount of money and other relief if any awarded,
including prejudgment interest, costs, fees, and all attorney's fees. It shall be
in writing and (unless the parties stipulate otherwise) be signed by the arbitrator.
(3) Entry of Judgment on Award and Timefor Demandfor Trial De Novo-Promptly upon the filing of the award(s) with the Clerk, the Clerk shall enter
judgment thereon in accordance with Rule 58, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Unless a party files and serves a written demand for a trial de novo within thirty
(30) days of the entry of judgment on the award, the judgment shall have the
same force or effect as any judgment of the Court in a civil action, except that
no appeal shall lie from such a judgment (any notice of appeal shall be treated
as a demand for a trial de novo).
(4) Sealing of Results-The contents of the award and judgment shall not
be made known to the judge assigned to the case until the district court action
is ultimately terminated. If a trial de novo is demanded, the arbitration clerk
shall place all arbitration documents in a sealed envelope before forwarding them
to the Clerk of the Court for filing.
(j) Trial De Novo(1) Acceptance or Rejection of Award(i) Each party has the option of accepting all of the arbitrator's awards
covering the claims by or against the party or of accepting some and
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rejecting others. However, as to an award on any particular opposing party,
the party must either accept or reject the award in its entirety.
(ii) A party who accepts all of the awards may specifically indicate
that he or she intends the acceptance to be effective only if all opposing
parties accept. If this limitation is not included in the acceptance, an
accepting party is deemed to have agreed to entry of judgment on those
awards as to which all opposing parties accept, with the action to continue
on the remaining outstanding claims between the accepting party and those
opposing parties who reject.
(iii) If a party makes a limited acceptance under subparagraph (j)(l)(ii)
and some of the opposing parties accept and others reject, for the purposes
of the cost provisions of subparagraph (j) the party is deemed to have
rejected as to those opposing parties who accept.
(iv) If any deinand for a trial de novo is made as provided for in
subparagraph (i)(3), the judgment entered thereon, or any portion of it
pertaining to an award(s) which has been rejected, shall immediately be
vacated by the Clerk and the action, or the portion thereof pertaining to
the rejected award(s), shall proceed in the normal manner before the assigned
Judge.
(2) Limitation on Evidence-At a trial de novo, unless the parties have
otherwise stipulated, no evidence of or concerning the arbitration may be received
into evidence, except that statements made by a witness at the arbitration hearing
may be used for impeachment only.
(3) Arbitrator's Costs-The party requesting a trial de novo will deposit
the cost of the arbitrator's services prior to trial de novo and if he fails to obtain
judgment in an amount which, exclusive of interest and costs is more favorable
to that party, such funds so paid will be retained by the Clerk. If he is successful
in obtaining a more favorable result, he shall be reimbursed such prepaid costs.
(4) Opposing Party's Costs(i) If a party has rejected an award and the action proceeds to trial,
that party must pay the opposing party's actual costs unless the verdict is
more favorable to the rejecting party than the arbitrator's award on that
claim. However, if the opposing party has also rejected that award, a party
is entitled to costs only if the verdict is more favorable to that party than
the arbitrator's award.
(ii) For the purpose of subparagraph (j)(4)(i), a verdict must be adjusted
by adding to it costs and interests on the amount of the verdict from the
filing of the complaint to the date of the arbitrator's award. After this
adjustment, the verdict is considered more favorable to a defendant if it is
more than 10 percent below the award, and is considered more favorable
to the plaintiff if it is more than 10 percent above the award.
(iii) Actual costs include those costs and fees taxable in any civil
action and attorneys' fees for each day of trial as may be determined by
the Court.
(iv) For good cause shown, the Court may order relief from payment
of any or all costs as set out in subparagraphs 0)(3) and (j)(4)(i) and (4)(ii).
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(v) The provisions of paragraph (4)(i), (ii) and (iii) shall not apply to
claims to which the United States or one of its agencies is a party.
(k) Cases in Process-Notwithstanding the provisions of the rules set forth
above, each District Judge shall select cases from his docket currently in process
and notify counsel involved of his intention to place such case on the arbitration
track.
A case will qualify for resort to arbitration if it complies with the provisions
of this Rule.
Provided, however, that no case notwithstanding such selection for arbitration
shall be set for arbitration hearing without providing thirty (30) days for additional
discovery unless the parties have been previously advised by either a scheduling
or pretrial order that the case shall be ready for trial prior to the expiration of
such 30-day period.
(1) Effective Date-The effective date of this Rule for the Southern Division
of this District shall be
, except for those cases deemed
ready for arbitration on or before that date and preselected by the District Judges
for arbitration.
(m) Relationship to Mediation and Summary Jury Trials-In the adoption of
Rule 43, the Court does not intend to abolish Rule 42 or 44. All cases that meet
the eligibility requirements of Rule 42 or 44 qualifying for mediation, summary
jury trial or mini-trial will continue to be so qualified by the Court.
Provided, however, any party who has been subject to Rule 43 process may
not be required to forego his right to trial de novo under the provisions of
subsection (j). -

